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Since President Harry S. Truman's signing of Executive Order 9981 (Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces), the United States Marine Corps has continuously lagged behind its sister services in regards to fully integrating African Americans and other minorities in its organizational structure. The past attempts to establish initiatives to increase the Corps' officer ranks in a timely manner were slow in progress and have reached the attention of Congress and the senior levels of Marine Corps leadership. From a cultural and community perspective, African Americans have had to face tremendous adversity in the United States. With the establishments of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the court decision Brown vs. Board of Education, African Americans continue to fight to establish more prominent roles in the United States Government and American industry. Even though the current Commander-In-Chief is of mixed race, which shows our country's tremendous progress, efforts to remedy the Marine Corps' efforts in increasing its African American officer population have a long way to go. This MMS paper will not be an endeavor to complain about current circumstances, but offer professional perspective to:

1. Show how the problem manifested itself in the Marine Corps through historical references and research.
2. Shed light on how the Marine Corps attempted to remedy the problem.
3. Highlight how past culture/community influence has possibly hindered current Officer recruitment in the Marine Corps.
4. Critically analyze the Marine Corps officer recruiting process and recommend different initiatives to enhance and improve the recruiting process.

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5. Offer a "counterinsurgency" perspective by using a modified targeting process of Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) and Line of Operation (LOO) design to ensure enduring mission requirements are fulfilled for the Marine Corps. This paper is designed to provide the reader and a decision maker with sufficient information that is reinforced with proper historical analysis so he or she can act in the future for the better of the Marine Corps.

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Quantico, Virginia, 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD AFRICAN AMERICAN OFFICERS: CONTEXT
AND THE MISSION TO INCREASE THE PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS SEEKING AN OFFICER'S COMMISSION IN THE UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Executive Summary

Title: Looking For A Few Good African American Officers: Context and the Mission to Increase the Percentage of African Americans Seeking an Officer's Commission in the United States Marine Corps.

Author: Major Dominique B. Neal, USMC

Thesis: Recruitment of African Americans into the officer ranks of the United States Marine Corps which, because of initiatives undertaken in the initial 1970s decade, had for a period shown positive signs of advancement, has of late and for a variety of reasons not sustained similar levels.

Discussion: Since President Harry S. Truman's signing of Executive Order 9981 (Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces), the United States Marine Corps has continuously lagged behind its sister services in regards to fully integrating African Americans and other minorities in its organizational structure. The past attempts to establish initiatives to increase the Corps' officer ranks in a timely manner were slow in progress and have reached the attention of Congress and the senior levels of Marine Corps leadership. From a cultural and community perspective, African Americans have had to face tremendous adversity in the United States. With the establishments of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the court decision *Brown vs. Board of Education*, African Americans continue to fight to establish more prominent roles in the United States Government and American industry. Even though the current Commander-In-Chief is of mixed race, which shows our country's tremendous progress, efforts to remedy the Marine Corps' efforts in increasing its African American officer population have a long way to go. This MMS paper will not be an endeavor to complain about current circumstances, but offer professional perspective to:

1. Show how the problem manifested itself in the Marine Corps through historical references and research.
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4. Critically analyze the Marine Corps officer recruiting process and recommend different initiatives to enhance and improve the recruiting process.
5. Offer a "counterinsurgency" perspective by using a modified targeting process of Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) and Line of Operation (LOO) design to ensure enduring mission requirements are fulfilled for the Marine Corps.

This paper is designed to provide the reader and a decision maker with sufficient information that is reinforced with proper historical analysis so he or she can act in the future for the better of the Marine Corps.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps is facing a challenging time in 2012. While reducing the organization's end strength to stabilize at approximately 182000 personnel, the Marine Corps at the direction of the Commandant directed MCRC to increase the representation

of minorities (specifically African Americans). These types of constraints require innovative thinking and flexible campaign planning. Through analysis of historical challenges, integration programs, and recommendations to different approaches, this research paper sought to expose the problems both the African American community and the organization faced up to this point in time. Both facets (organization and community) experienced triumph and adversity. This is a critical point where both facets need to break away from traditional thought processes and overcome bias in order to bridge the gap. Both are culpable and both are accountable for the future of the Marine Corps minority population. If the senior community leaders cannot look past the racial injustices, then barriers will continue to exist. The Marine Corps also needs to expand its endeavors and be critical to the agencies that provide data based on cultural beliefs regarding military service. Endeavors such as honoring the Montford Point Marines and implementing their history into the Marine Corps PME program is a good start, but there is a lot more work yet to be done. The Marine Corps should continue to invest in mentoring and developing its minority officers who currently serve so they can aid in building the minority structure within the organization. This should start at OCS and TBS and continue throughout their career. Like combat operations and operational strategic planning, recruiting and proper force structural planning will provide the Marine Corps with a lifetime of success and prosperity as a premier fighting force in readiness, which is one of many feats the Marine Corps prides itself in.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR, MAJOR D. B. NEAL, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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PREFACE

With the repeal of the “Don’t Ask – Don’t Tell” policy, one could expect a spike in misconduct within the military services, especially one as headstrong and traditional bound as the United States Marine Corps. Based on historical examples of racial misconduct and maltreatment of African Americans in the Marine Corps at the beginning of desegregation and mandatory racial integration, one could expect a similar intolerance for homosexuals. Today, this expectation could not be further from the truth. If anything, the Marine Corps, compared to its sister services, advertises that the organization possess an environment of absolute fairness and promotes impartial treatment of its personnel allowing them to excel or perish at their own fate.

Like all other components of the United States Armed Forces, the Marine Corps was one of the few organizations that was more progressive in response to the changes in the social dynamics of American society. In fact, the Marine Corps was the first Service Component to fully integrate unlike, its sister Services that integrated African Americans incrementally. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps presently has not reaped the full benefits of integration as indicated in the disappointing numbers of African Americans serving as commissioned officers. To highlight this point, I observed the promotion of Major Keisha Flagg to Lieutenant Colonel. As of January 7, 2012, she is one of three African American female Lieutenant Colonels in the entire Marine Corps today. Colonel Stephanie C. Smith administered the promotion and oath ceremony. Colonel Stephanie C. Smith, the daughter of a Montford Point Marine, is the only African American female Colonel in the Marine Corps today. These two examples are only the tip of the iceberg. There are simply not many African American in the Marine Corps’ officer pipeline.

When looking at the Fiscal Years (FY) FY09, FY10, FY11, and FY12 statistics of African American officer progression in the Marine Corps, one would assume that these select few officers are “a dying breed,” doomed to peak at the Company Grade level (Lieutenant to Captain) and therefore filter out to the civilian sector or plateau at O-4 (Major) thus terminating any possibility of command, Professional Military Education opportunities, and almost zero opportunity for selection to the General Officer rank. Is this really the case? Is there a problem? The statistics from multiple United States Marine Corps sources will highlight the major concern the Corps is currently facing.

I became interested in this topic matter because, in a few short months, I will assume command of Recruit Station Los Angeles, California, 12th Marine Corps Recruiting District. The area of operation within the Los Angeles recruiting region possesses tremendous diversity that is common in any major metropolitan coastal city. The Recruit Station’s area of operation spans Los Angeles to as far north as Paso Robles and as far inland as Bakersfield. Recruit Station Los Angeles interacts and recruits from a mixing bowl of African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans and Caucasian Americans. Within these ethnic backgrounds, there are multiple layers of social class structure. These social structures range from rural farm communities, to inner city communities, and finally the suburban communities. Their diverse experience is an added and much needed strength for our Corps presently and especially our future.

When I found out that I was eligible for Recruiting Duty, the conversation regarding African American officer recruitment and its shortfall became a topic that consumed the majority of my conversation with other Recruit Station Commanding Officers. My peers informed me that this issue was a priority within Marine Corps

Recruiting Command and with the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Over the holiday period, I was fortunate enough to attend a briefing to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos regarding the historical importance of the Montford Point Marines. During the brief, General Amos reiterated the richness and importance of this particular chapter in the Marine Corps with regard to the Montford Point Marines' perseverance to serve in their country during a time when they were treated unequally as human beings. He also reiterated that he was not happy with the low percentage of African Americans serving as commissioned officers in the Marine Corps. General Amos informed the audience that his guidance to his Recruit Station Commanding Officers was to place a particular focus in finding high quality African Americans for officer accession in the Marine Corps. Quite frankly, he was not content with the low percentage of African American Officer representation within our organization. In return, his guidance confirmed my interest in this particular subject matter. In order to achieve long-term success regarding this problem, one must take time to fully understand the problem. In this particular case, there are multiple layers to this problem. The old adages, "there are not enough African Americans who can meet the minimum qualifications," or "past historical experiences have made African American less likely to want to use their education to serve in the Marine Corps," are dangerous assumptions or limitations to invest in.

This research paper will explore this multilayered issue by examining the historical background, how history affects today's Marine Corps Officer programs, and what can be done to enable our organization's capability to remedy this issue in the long term. Prior to reading the source document, I highly recommend that the reader view

Appendix A which discusses the history of numerous initiatives implemented within the military that at times promoted African American involvement in the military. These initiatives in return depicted more burden than benefit of African Americans all the way up to mandatory integration and the Vietnam War. This rich historical aspect imprinted an attitude toward the military by the African American culture, which still affects and plagues recruitment and accession today.

"I ATTENDED THE OCS GRADUATION ON 31 MARCH 2012. IT WAS A PLEASURE AND HONOR TO HAVE BEEN INVITED AND TO WITNESS 168 BRAND NEW LIEUTENANTS POISED FOR THE REST OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CAREERS. IT WAS THE FIRST OCS GRADUATION I ATTENDED SINCE MY OWN, WAY BACK IN 1969 (IT WAS THE FIRST TO WHICH I HAD BEEN INVITED SINCE 1969--I SHOULD HAVE "INVITED MYSELF" TO MORE!). THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS A VERY GOOD FRIEND AND AN OUTSTANDING OFFICER AND LEADER. I NATURALLY COMPARED AND CONTRASTED THE CLASS TO MY OWN OF 1969, ESPECIALLY IN DIVERSITY. IT WAS AN EXACT COPY OF MY 1969 CLASS. AS I MAY HAVE SHARED WITH YOU DURING THE INTERVIEW, I WAS THE ONLY AFRO-AMERICAN IN MY PLATOON AND ONE OF ONLY 3 AFRO-AMERICANS IN THE WHOLE COMPANY, WHICH COMMISSIONED 216 OFFICERS, AS BEST I RECALL. THERE WERE 2 ENLISTED AFRO-AMERICAN OFFICER INSTRUCTORS (AS BEST I CAN RECALL) AND NO AFRO-AMERICAN OFFICERS. IT APPEARS WE HAVE NOT MOVED THE BALL DOWN THE FIELD AT ALL, OR PERHAPS WE HAVE GONE FULL CIRCLE--FEW, SEVERAL, AND BACK TO FEW. I WISH NOT TO BE TOO CRITICAL, INASMUCH I HAVE NOT ATTENDED ANOTHER RECENT OCS GRADUATION AGAINST WHICH TO COMPARE MY 31 MARCH 2012 OBSERVATIONS."

-Major General Arnold Fields, USMC Retired, 4 APRIL 2012

INTRODUCTION

The Marine Corps is open to all qualified applicants who seek to enlist or serve as an officer offering life changing opportunity and experience in a fair and impartial environment. Unfortunately, demographics indicate that within the officer corps, this ideal has not manifested in a manner to favor the Marine Corps' strive for unbiased and fair opportunity. In fact, the current demographic breakdown within the Marine Corps in specific to the African American population is alarmingly low. The Marine Corps, which prides itself in being at the forefront of change, has the lowest percentage of African Americans serving as officers ranking number four out of four against all the Department of Defense (DOD) Service Components. The low percentage of ethnic and gender (women) minorities questions the concept of the Marine Corps as an organization that promotes fairness and equality. Recruitment of African Americans into the officer ranks of the United States Marine Corps which, because of initiatives undertaken in the initial 1970s decade, had for a period shown positive signs of advancement, has of late and for a variety of reasons not sustained similar levels.

Numerous articles were written within the last ten years highlighting this problem regarding the low number of African American Marine Officers. Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) mandated an investigative report by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission titled *From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century*. This report provided a thorough examination of the whole DOD organization. From this report and Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower management analysis, all endeavors to increase the African American Officer population were inadequate therefore depicting the perception that the Marine Corps was slow to make progressive changes.

This Masters of Military Studies paper will undertake to review briefly the context for African American officer recruitment and next advance the thesis that, by using focused tools of analysis – such as employed in the extensive counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and familiar to those who are veterans of those experiences-Marine Corps Recruiting Station Commanding Officers and Officer Selection Officers can act to bring such recruitment to the levels needed and desired.

1970 – PRESENT AND ANALYSIS OF MARINE OFFICER RECRUITMENT

THE VANCE MEMORANDUM 1967¹.

The interest in recruiting and filling the officer ranks with minorities is not a new issue within DOD. DOD initially raised the concern in 1967. Colonel Alfonso Davis identified in the Marine Corps historical publication *Pride, Progress, and Prospects* that Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance delivered a memorandum to Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze concerning “the distressingly low Negro officer content of the Marine Corps and the Navy.”²

Vance applauded the Navy and Marine Corps regarding increases of African American appointments to the United States Naval Academy and enrollment at Naval Reserve Officer Training Centers (NROTC). Because the percentages were notably poor, he suggested to the Navy Department at a minimum, should double their efforts in increasing the minority numbers. The focus of these efforts would be placed upon finding talent among the senior enlisted ranks and establishing NROTC Units at Historical Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU).

THE MOSO AND OTHER INITIATIVES OF THE 1970s.

The Marine Corps created numerous initiatives to increase the African American officer percentages in the Marine Corps³: the Human Relations Training Program, the Commandant's Advisory Committee on Minority Affairs, and the Equal Opportunity Staff Section.

The Commandant's Advisory Committee consisted of both military and civilian professionals of various ethnicities. The Commandant also provided a new officer recruiting and retention strategy directed at seeking and retaining African American officers in the Marine Corps. In order to keep abreast on all issues relating to the strategy, the Commandant also created a new officer billet: Special Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower) for Minority Officer Procurement. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Berthoud, Jr., an African American served as the first officer in this billet. During General Chapman's tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps, he directed three objectives regarding African American officer recruitment⁴: increasing the number of Negro Officers, assigning Negro Officers to high-visibility, career enhancing billets, and improving the retention rate of Negro Officers.

In meeting these three objectives, the first initiative implemented into the recruiting process was the Negro Officer Selection Officer (NOSO), which was renamed the Minority Officer Selection Officer (MOSO)⁵. The task and purpose of the MOSO was to augment and assist the already established Officer Selection Officers (OSOs) in Marine Corps Recruiting Districts in order to attract African American officer prospects. This assignment did not preclude the MOSOs from contracting non-African American prospects, but African Americans were the main effort. As Berthoud stated,

This strategy was to augment the number of Black officer candidates we (the Marine Corps) were trying to get from the Enlisted Commissioning Programs (ECP) and the Broadened Opportunity for Officer Selection Training program (BOOST). Also we needed to increase the visibility of black officers at the Naval Academy, the Marine Barracks at 8th & I, NROTC units, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. At that time (1968), I was the only Black officer assigned there. Despite the tendency to lower the standards, the Black who initially worked on this issue wanted to make sure the standards were the same as they were for the White officer applicants.⁶

The concern regarding the qualification standards for becoming a Marine Corps officer was an issue that has resonated throughout the Marine Corps recruiting process and would be tested in the 1990s with the “12-12-5” initiative in which the standards would be compromised in order to meet recruiting goals for African American officers. In regards to the 1967 memorandum by Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary Thomas D. Morris stated, “it was indicated that the establishment of an NROTC unit at a predominately Negro institution (HBCU) appeared feasible with possible alterations to present standards.”⁷

Another pioneer in the recruiting of African American officers was Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Peterson, who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Berthoud. Lieutenant Colonel Peterson’s importance in Marine Corps history was the fact that he was the first African American to earn naval aviation wings, the first of his ethnicity to command a

tactical aviation squadron, and the first African American to ascend to the rank of a General officer in the Marine Corps. Under the Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert E. Cushman, he served as the Special Assistant for Minority Affairs to the Commandant. During his tenure in the position, he expanded the MOSO construct with 11 African American officers and placed them in cities where there was higher preponderance of young African American prospects. Additional MOSOs were placed in the following cities⁸: Atlanta (Georgia), Kansas City (Missouri), Los Angeles (California), New Orleans (Louisiana), New York City (New York), Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Raleigh (North Carolina), Richmond (Virginia), San Francisco (California), and Washington D.C.

Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Peterson disestablished the term MOSO, transitioning the African American officers into OSOs. He also placed an African American OSO in various recruiting district headquarters in order to assist the African American OSOs located in subordinate recruiting stations. The trade off of these officers becoming OSOs was the concern of maintaining the responsibility for recruiting minority officers and loosing Mission Occupational Specialty (MOS) credibility due to being pulled out of the operational forces early in their careers.⁹

Major Edward L. Green replaced Lieutenant Colonel Peterson in the special billet until his retirement in 1980. During his tenure, Major Green focused on minority performance at The Basic School (TBS) and command assignments. He also served at the United States Naval Academy where he was able to influence African American Midshipman in seeking a commission in the Marine Corps. At the twilight of his career, he successfully earned the opportunity to command an infantry battalion. The final

African American to serve in the special billet until 1993 was Major Solomon P. Hill. A former executive officer at Officer Candidate School (OCS) circa 1970, the program would end under his tenure. Other initiatives that were accomplished under the MOSO construct was the continued assignment of minority officers as the United States Naval Academy and additional non-HBCU ROTC units throughout the country. During this time, the requirement for the Navy to source 16 2/3 percent of its candidates became official which required the Marine Corps to seek its fair share of qualified applicants. The Marine Corps sought to provide the NROTC programs with its best officers and the focus of effort would be the HBCUs. Competition now arose between the Navy and the Marine Corps to seek qualified minority candidates.

The outcome of this endeavor allowed the establishment of five new HBCU NROTC Units, which were¹⁰: Florida A&M University (1972), Prairie View A&M University (1968), North Carolina Central University (1972), Savannah State University (1971), and Southern State University (1971). The establishment of NROTC Programs at HBCUs also allowed focus for minority officers to be placed at OCS and TBS. Major Clay Baker served as a executive officer at OCS while Captain Archie Joe Biggers served as an instructor at TBS. This maintained the very best representation of minority officers as role models, as both men were decorated infantry officers of the Vietnam War.

INFORMATION OPERATION MESSAGING OF THE 1970s AND ITS RESULTS.

Major General Ronald Bailey's (1st Marine Division Commanding General and former MCRC Commanding General) previous message regarding the "whole of community approach" was not a new concept for the Marine Corps. The issue that resonated in the Marine Corps of the 1970s was getting the message out to the

community in order to provide opportunity to seek service as an officer in the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps' ground zero for communication during the 1970s was opening channels with organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Montfort Point Marine Association. Colonel Davis explains,

Relationships of this nature would prove to be critical elements in the Marine Corps' attempts to publicize its efforts, generate interest and applicants, and receive valuable "grass roots" response as to the effectiveness of its strategy. Years later this idea would be expanded, producing varying degrees of success.¹¹

During the initial measures of recruiting African American officers (prior to 1972), there were no quotas or recruiting/retention goals established, which also asked the question if the Marine Corps was meeting success with their current initiatives. In response to the need for further guidance in the matter, the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued a CMC Memorandum that established a minority accession goal from 1972-1976. Immediately following the CMC Memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of Navy directed a yearly minority accession goal in 1977. The dilution of the minority goal, which compromised the "Minority - Black Officer Recruitment" initiatives occurred when DOD implemented the inclusion of the Hispanic goal into the minority goal for the Marine Corps. By the end of 1979, the Marine Corps failed in meeting the Hispanic/Black officer accession goal.

The 1970s accession initiatives proved a right step in the direction of obtaining more African American officers. While the Marine Corps began to transition its manpower requirements, which included the reduction in end-strength, the percentage of African American officer representation grew from 1.2% in 1971 to 3.7% in 1979. Although this three-fold increase was notable, an important aspect of this accession,

which still haunts the Marine Corps today, is the low number of African American women as officers. By 1979, only one African American woman held a field grade rank. Today only one African American woman holds the rank of O-6. Additionally, another accomplishment for the Marine Corps was that a greater percentage of the minority officers served in combat arms mission occupational specialties (i.e., aviation, infantry, artillery, tanks), which traditionally offer the most opportunity for career progression and command. As Colonel Alphonse Davis highlights:

Although the Marine Corps does not promote its officers based on occupational requirements, it is a widely held belief that the maximum opportunities for command assignments and promotions reside within the combat arms occupational fields (aviation, infantry, artillery, and armor), as opposed to combat support and combat service support fields. The latter two occupational fields include specialties such as communications, combat engineer, supply, maintenance, motor transport, and logistics.¹²

Within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organization, the Ground Combat Element (GCE) provides a substantial amount of opportunities to command from the company grade to field grade unlike the other elements of the MAGTF. Therefore with the larger percentage of serving African Americans serving in the GCE and the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), there were notable highlighted successes in African American Officer accession opportunity. The Marine Corps implemented effective measures to promote opportunity and success while combating the community culture of previous outward cultural prejudice and scrutiny:

The 1970s can be best characterized as the beginning of monumental change in the racial composition of the Marine Corps. Nearly 15 years after the integration of its ranks and 22 years after the commissioning of the first black Marine officer, the Marine Corps began to reap modest benefits from the various officer recruiting and accession implemented 10 years earlier.¹³

By the end of the 1970s, the initiatives paved the way for those officers to serve in future high-level billets. Pioneers such as Lieutenant General Walter Gaskins, Lieutenant

General Frank Peterson, Major General Arnold Fields, Major General Clifford Stanley, and Major General Charles Bolden were “plank holders” of the 1970 initiatives.

THE 1980s, AMOP, AND THE DEGRADATION OF MINORITY RECRUITMENT.

After the notable initiatives and changes, the Marine Corps altered its focus and initiatives, which would adversely affect the recruiting measures and additionally degrade accession power in the 1990s. Three competing factors that arguably affected the reduction in African American officers serving in the Marine Corps were: the Marine Corps expanded its focus to all minority groups therefore diluting and degrading the results; post Vietnam downsizing in the 1980s forced different budget friendly recruiting measures; and society began to change its view of African Americans in the 1980s enabling outside growth in job opportunities, thus competing with the Marine Corps for the same resource.

In the 1980s decade, the Marine Corps ended numerous measures that proved beneficial due to an overconfident assessment of improved race relations both inside the Marine Corps and civilian society. Successful initiatives that were discontinued were: the Human Relations Training Program, the Special Advisor for Minority Affairs, the Minority Officer Selection Officer Concept, and the Commandant’s Advisory Committee on Minority Affairs. With expanded focus of targeting all minority groups in the 1980s, the Marine Corps was plagued with failure regarding accession goals of individual ethnic groups. However, from 1980 to 1982, the Marine Corps reached or exceeded the accession goals for collective minority goals. This overall minority goal shielded the individual ethnic group goal failure.

At a time when college education within the African American community was at a premium, Colonel Davis's statistics in 1980 reflected that the "the percentage of minority males possessing a bachelor's degrees is 12.1 percent. The percentage of Blacks in the national population was approximately 8.5 percent."¹⁴ These percentages would be the driving force in order to increase minority officer strength within the Marine Corps. Initiatives to increase the minority percentages were given a required goal to complete by 1992.

Under the enduring guidance of Commandants Robert Barrow, Paul X. Kelley, and Alfred Gray, two major initiatives were established in order to increase minority officer accession. The first initiative was the designation of the MOSO to the Assistant for Minority Officer Procurement (AMOP). Both 6th (Atlanta) and 8th (New Orleans) Districts were selected to support these billets. These districts were selected because of the large population of HBCUs. The primary focus of the AMOP was to assist each district by canvassing local community establishments such as churches, sororities, and fraternities. The MOSOs, which were tasked with the sole focus at the recruit station ceased to exist. The shortfall of transitioning the MOSO to OSO meant that OSOs had to provide an overall mission not providing as much attention to the specific target audience. The burden was placed at the district level in only two districts. The AMOP also had a broader canvas to influence, which limits the effectiveness in a large recruiting area. The first officers to fill the AMOP position were Captain David Jones (Supply Officer, Atlanta District) and Captain W. Clyde Lemon (Combat Engineer, New Orleans)¹⁵.

The second initiative for increasing minority officer accession was the establishment of officer recruiting goal by ethnic category, which was generated by Colonel Robert C. Lewis.¹⁶ The goal would be based on demographic areas of each recruiting region. The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) provided the statistical data in order to aid and apply the proper ethnic goals in each recruiting district. The minimum requirements to become an officer in 1989 were a,¹⁷ SAT score of 1000, or an ACT score of 45. The Center for Naval Analysis (CAN) assessed the following data¹⁸: 6th District possessed the largest proportion of African Americans at 28.6 percent. This district was responsible for the following states: Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina; 4th District possessed the second largest proportion of African Americans at 21.6 percent. This district was responsible for the following states: Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia; and 12th District had the smallest proportion of African Americans at 13.1 percent. This district was responsible for the South West and Western states.

The data guided the Marine Corps in determining which district would pay the heaviest price of work in order to reach its overall organizational goal. In order to meet the demand for regions with a large goal due to proportional locations, the Marine Corps authorized a measure similar to Recruiters Assistance to recently graduated African American and Hispanic TBS Lieutenants. The minority junior officers would provide up to 14 days of assistance before leaving the district. Although a noteworthy concept, the 14-day period flawed the true potential of this concept due to lack of continuity. While General Carl Mundy served as the director of Personnel Procurement, he maintained a vocal interest in minority officer procurement into the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, the

new implementation measures did not bear fruit that was conducive to gaining minority officers. The percentages dropped and,

The Marine Corps' recruiting efforts from 1983 to 1989 reflected a 23 percent decrease in new lieutenant requirements (from 1890 to 1458), accompanied by a corresponding decrease of approximately 25 percent in black officer accessions (121 in fiscal 1983 to 90 in fiscal year 1989). Black officer accession goals for six years of the seven-year period were set at six percent of the yearly accession goals.¹⁹

Although some data annotated an increase of African American officers in the Marine Corps, the increase was due to the increase of officer end strength as a whole from 16,794 to 18,466, which had an increase of 250 more African American officers. Still, the increase of African American officers did not impact the overall percentage increase weighed against the total officer increase. One notable achievement during the 1980s was the promotion of an African American officer to Brigadier General.

Additionally, during the 1980s, there was a desire to seek out African American officers to serve in combat arms specialties due to the higher career and command potential as well fulfilling the need to have representative role models for the minority enlisted within the combat arms communities. By 1989, only two percent were represented in the aviation community and only four percent were represented in the ground combat arms communities. By the end of the decade (1989) the percentage of African American officers in the Marine Corps was 4.8 percent. Although troubling to the Marine Corps, the organization countered with the conclusion from an annual Equal Opportunity Assessment that African American officers were being afforded the same opportunities for career progression. This conclusion would prove to be a false sense of security and a dangerous assessment that would impact initiatives in the 1990s. Regarding the end of the 1980s,

Black officers represented five percent (62) of all commanding officers in the Marine Corps and nearly four percent (32) executive officers. In 1985, black officers represented 4.4 percent (816) of the number of company and battalion commanders, however, were aviation unit commanders. This was a clear indication that there was work yet to done.²⁰

THE 1990s, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.

The 1990s were plagued with a number of race related issues that affected the views of minorities in the Marine Corps. Key issues were²¹: the Commandant's Task Force on Equal Opportunity; Officer Candidates School attrition and the filing of a class action suit by a former Asian American officer candidate alleging discrimination; the inclusion of an Ethnic Diversity Seminar in the 1993 General Officers Symposium; a segment in African American officer discrimination within the Marine Corps featured on the CBS television show 60 Minutes; the publishing of numerous articles in the professional journals and Service news sources regarding the recruiting, assignment, and discrimination against "minority" Marine officers; the convening of Quality Management Boards on OCS attrition and the career development of Marine officers; the implementation of racial and ethnic category recruiting goals established by the 1989 CNA study; and the implementation of racial and ethnic category accession goals.

In recent interview with retired Major General Arnold "Arnie" Fields, the question was asked as how to attack the social dynamic of how the Marine Corps needs to progress. He offered three key points,²² understanding the society we live in and how we extract those who seek to serve; the historical influences both within and outside of the Marine Corps; and understanding the continuous change of the environment. Change is happening now. We must understand how change will impact our ability to get the job done (impact i.e., draw down, society's views, etc.).

During the 1990s, social and domestic issues radically changed again. The “buzz” topic during this period was diversity. The process of Affirmative Action was the potential solution for gaining diversity in large organizations. Because governance at the state and local levels were making efforts to diversify their programs, the military soon began to feel the pressures from the federal level. There is no doubt that the military is a small reflection of society, therefore social issues will also carry over into the Marine Corps. Since diversity was still a relevant topic, a number of new programs were implemented into the Marine Corps in hopes to improve the minority number of African American officers.

The first initiative in the 1990s by General Gray was the establishment of the Commandant’s Equal Opportunity Task Force. The purpose for convening this task force “was the pervasive perception among minority officers that they are not being afforded an equal opportunity to compete for promotion.”²³ The Commandant among many other senior officers shared the same concern regarding the minority issue. With this task force, General Gray invited senior members of African American organizations such as the NAACP, NNOA, and the Montfort Point Marine Association to attend the annual conferences. At this annual conference, the Commandant would outline specific directions such as “the implementation of progressive specific racial and ethnic category recruiting and accession goals.”²⁴

His White Letter directed,

All general officers, commanding officers, and officers in charge that the areas targeted for improvement related to increasing the presence of African American officers, were assignments, to include recruiting, schools, and staffs, promotions to include representation on promotion boards and promotion board precepts addressing the effects of bias and the disparate assignment of minorities outside of their occupational fields.²⁵

THE VETTER AND PALM BOARDS.

In March 1992, Colonel David A. Vetter headed another organizational measure known as the Quality Management Board for increased diversity of African American officers. The Quality Management Board initially consisted of Caucasian American senior officers but eventually had participation by African American officers as well. The board's first issue to attack was the failure or attrition percentages at OCS and TBS. "Attrition data for the five-year period, 1989 to 1993, revealed that African American officer candidate attrition ranged from one percent to 12 percent higher than the attrition rates for white candidates."²⁶

Outcomes from Colonel Vetter's board were²⁷: that more highly qualified minority and female officers be assigned to the OCS permanent staff; that the Marine Corps Affirmative Action Plan be reviewed and updated with consideration given to developing a more comprehensive and aggressive plan; that the mentoring concept, under the broader dimensions of a leader's basic responsibilities, be further developed and implemented; [however,] these programs should not be designed exclusively for minorities; the Marine Corps raise the minimum officer EL score requirement to 120, but only after an expanded enlisted commissioning program with a special emphasis on minorities is in place; the Marine Corps demonstrate institutional awareness, recognition, and sensitivity to the fact that minorities face certain "special challenges" that need to be addressed; and the Marine Corps undertake a high priority coordinated effort with the overarching goal of improving the opportunities of minorities and women for success.... Process Action Teams to develop specific plans of action in the following areas: performance evaluation system; officer assignment/MOS patterns; commissioning

programs (civilian and enlisted); education and awareness programs relating to cultural diversity/special challenges; and the Marine Corps Affirmative Action Plan.

These measures were implemented when examining the records of multiple candidates who both succeeded and failed OCS. A follow on Quality Management Board convened under the direction of Brigadier General Leslie Palm. Under the Palm Board, service members of different backgrounds of MOSs, ethnicity, and gender would expand on the recommendations from the Vetter Board. The expansion would develop the Commandant's Diversity Campaign Plan covering the areas of accession, training, and retention. The campaign plan would eventually become Operation Order 1-95, which was disseminated March 17, 1995. The plan directed a three-phased plan that would recruit, train, and retain minority officers. The first phase, which was recruiting, saw the inception of the 12-12-5 plan (12% Black, 12% Hispanic, 5% Other). Key tasks within the recruiting arena identified²⁸: the implementation of an officer accession plan (exclusive of warrant officers) that yielded accessions totaling 12 percent black, 12 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent other racial or ethnic categories by fiscal year 2000; a training and education plan to support the Commandant's vision; and an analysis of the fitness report (performance evaluation system) to ensure it supported the Commandant's intent.

During this time period which was the mid-1990s, the Marine Corps was under the magnifying glass regarding minority shortfalls and projected institutional racism. The 12-12-5 Plan fueled a great deal of debate and criticism from Marine Corps officers in addition to articles, which were written about institutional racism and bias within the organization. The Commandant of the Marine Corps established an Affirmative Action

Plan on 17 November 1988, which outlined a goal for African American officers to be six percent and for Hispanics at three percent along with other minority ethnicities. This increase was projected for the years 1990 to 1992.

Plagued with controversy, the Marine Corps faced a number of social obstacles when dealing with the projected institutional racism. General Carl Mundy's comments to the media regarding his assessments of African Americans did not help the Marine Corps. In the CBS syndicated news show, 60 Minutes, there was a segment that questioned the assessed bias and institutional racism within the Marine Corps. The segment interviewed a number of African American Marine officers regarding their observations and experiences. In the segment General Mundy, who was the Commandant at the time, made generalized and controversial statements regarding African Americans' performance in areas such as "marksmanship, swimming, and land navigation."²⁹

Numerous articles were published in the *Marine Corps Gazette* regarding minority officer accession and its priority in the Corps. One article stated from a Marine Officer at Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower stated that,

There exists a paradox in the Marine Corps' equal opportunity philosophy with respect to officer accessions and selections (promotions). The paradox is simply that the Corps accesses the "best" qualified within race/ethnic/gender group guidelines; however it selects only the "best" qualified for advancement to the next highest grade, irrespective of race/ethnic/gender group. The consequences of these two policies, what I like to call the accession/selection paradox is the crux of an equal opportunity misconception.³⁰

Other comments and concerns from among the Corps' officer ranks questioned if the Marine Corps was a social experiment for Congress or a fighting organization and do the American people really care. Another article titled, "Is the Corps Keeping Blacks from its Senior Officer Ranks,"

When a young black college graduate looks for examples of blacks who have had successful careers as officers in the military, Army General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, represents a service that concerns itself with racial matters without sacrificing quality. As that same individual looks to the Marines, the service is lacking in representation and willingly sacrifices quality black officers.³¹

The Marine Corps countered with its own statements to media outlets and papers in response to these controversial articles. Within the public affairs arena, the Marine Corps solicited to multiple minority publications such as *Ebony*, *Black Enterprise*, and the *Black Collegiate*. The Marine Corps also continued to engage the NAACP, Montford Point Marine Association, and NNOA in order to maintain their ties and relationships within the African American professional community. An added endeavor was the Marine Corps participation in the American Urban Networks' Black College Football All American Weekend. Annually, the Marine Corps would award one of the football athletes a leadership award for the athletes excellence in sports, the community, and academically³².

OPERATION ORDER 1-95, THE 12-12-5 PROGRAM.

The next controversial program was the 12-12-5 program which focused on building Marine Corps officer end strength comprised of 12 percent African American, 12 percent Hispanic, and 5 percent other ethnicity. One of the concerns was the method of recruitment on attaining these numbers. There were concerns with the quality versus quantity of recruiting minority officer candidates. Low performance scores and attrition from TBS and OCS from minorities questioned if they were even properly prepared and effectively assessed to participate in these programs.

The program originated from the Marine Corps' *Operation Order 1-95, Campaign Plan to Increase Diversity Within the Officer Corps of the Marine Corps*. The

final result desired from this order was the outlined percentages achieved by FY2000 and would shape the overall ethnic dynamic by FY 2015. As the plan progressed in the Marine Corps Recruiting efforts, the fruits of the labor in attaining minorities drew a substantial amount of criticism regarding the selection and high attrition rates of the selected minorities. Two articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* in 1997 and 1998 were written highlighting fundamental flaws in the plan and offered a number of solutions to remedy the plan.

The first article questioned the feasibility to recruit the required quantity of minority candidates within the allotted time period as well as maintaining the quality of each candidate. It discussed the issues such as disparity in quality, disparity in preparation, and disparity in performance (OCS) noting that,

According to Marine Corps statistics from fiscal years 1991-93, blacks accounted for 6.5 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.6 percent of officer accession goals, yet accounted for 27.1 percent, 32.4 percent, and 33.5 percent of the mental aptitude waivers assigned.³³

In this article, the author also noted that the entry-level test scores, although meeting the minimum Marine Corps Standards, were relatively lower than their Caucasian counterparts. The driving point with the waivers was to increase the throughput of minorities entering the OCC program. Traditionally, applications are screened and boarded by selected officers from Marine Corps Recruiting Command. The applicant who has the most competitive application will usually be granted acceptance into the program. However, with the 12-12-5 plan, diversity was the priority which would seek out minority applicants at any cost in order to meet monthly mission requirements allocated to the RS OSOs. But,

Recent studies show that of the available college-enrolled males, Blacks make up only 1 percent of the total pool available that can be expected to meet the qualifications for Marine Corps commissioning programs.³⁴

This one percent also faced other recruiting endeavors from other military services and top tier corporate businesses since they were most likely mandated to increase their diversity percentages. The constraint to meet the Corps' demands not only degraded the quality of candidates, but the process failed in ensuring that each minority candidate was fully prepared to meet the competitive demands of OCS. The article noted that,

Because of the large number of interested applicants for the majority slots at OCS, OSOs have the ability to pool candidates, actively preparing them for school 6 months to a year in advance. The difficulties associated with meeting the OSO's minority missions do not permit the same luxury.³⁵

In essence, if you were a minority applicant who met the minimum requirement or qualified for a waiver, you were immediately processed for the next OCS class while non-minority applicants waited 6 – 12 months for the next OCS class. Therefore, minority applicants appreciated the advantage of attaining an immediate OCS slot, however minority applicants did not enjoy the advantage of receiving 6-12 months of preparation and deliberate indoctrination for Marine Corps officer training. This factor was not assessed in conjunction with the already high attrition rates of OCS, and this is where the disparity in performance was unpleasant. Logically, any candidate with a 6-12 month waiting period in the OSO "pool" will have a significant advantage or will be better prepared to face the demands of officer candidate training.

Because of the decision to forgo the waiting period based on ethnic demands, the Marine Corps had a small percentage of their candidates who "washed out" of OCS for a number of reasons. However, if the normal recruiting process was adhered to in the

traditional sense, the attrition percentage could have been reduced. When an outsider looks at the end result, that person could mistakenly make the assumption of institutional racism. The very fact that minority candidates endured the difficulties of OCS and TBS whether it was mental or physical attributes resulted in a polarized view of the Marine Corps due to the flawed 12-12-5 plan.

A second article in 1998, “The Officer Procurement Process.” He assessed the actual procurement process. It explained that although the 12-12-5 plan was a noble cause in hopes to eliminate the racial barriers, but the end result raised speculation that the Marine Corps was institutionally biased or an institutionally racist organization. It stated that, “Unfortunately, like most well intentioned affirmative action programs, instead of leveling the playing field, 12-12-5 has led to racial discrimination in the officer procurement process.”³⁶

It praised however, the few unknown initiatives that the 12-12-5 program provided, which was the Marine Corps’ participation in minority conventions, conferences, colleges and job fairs. A great deal of funding went to educating the community about a career in the Marine Corps as a commissioned officer. In the end the article argued that establishing a quota or goal based on ethnicity is always a technique that will ensue scrutiny and controversy, and he validated this argument based on the how the Marine Corps conducted its screening process during that time period. He stated that, “Essentially, the African American applicants are screened, ranked, and selected until the desired number is met, then Hispanics, and so on. In the end, the class is filled with not the best overall applicants, but the best applicants taking into account the overriding goal of proper racial mix.”³⁷

In December 2011 during a Montford Point project brief to General James Amos, the current Commandant of the Marine Corps specifically stated,

I spoke to the RSCOs in California last week and stated that we need more African American officers. Now I told them that I would not establish a quota or a number. That's not what I wanted. I am not happy with the current status when it comes to the lack of diverse representation in the Marine Corps and we need to fix it.

General Amos also understood that this issue demanded an enduring focus, not a quick fix program. He understood that this specific fight would not see the fruits of Marine Corps' labor until two or three Marine Commandants have served and retired.

By the turn of the century (1999-2000), the programs that Marine Corps implemented to increase the African American population in the officer corps degraded into one of many federal affirmative action programs, which polarized people within and outside of the organization. Despite the multiple and notable accomplishments made by African American Marine Officers such as astronaut General Charles Bolden (Colonel at the time), the promotion to Brigadier General of Clifford Stanley, and other senior African American officers serving in high visibility commands or billet, the Marine Corps would inherit the following issues into the millennium as noted by Colonel Alphonse Davis³⁸: in the post Desert Storm era, a 50 percent decline in the propensity of African American males to join the military; a general perception that the military advertising is focused on the economically disadvantaged, featuring the military as a rational solution to the lack of funds for college; a perception among some that the civilian work force offers better opportunities; a categorization of the military by some as a "fallback" position if no other options materialize; a rise in the average age of the population, accompanied by a reduction in the pool of young workers; and predictions that question the competence and skills of new entrants into the work force

2000 –PRESENT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

With the events of September 11, 2001, and the shift to the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps had a bigger priority to manage. The organization had to shift its focus of effort to increasing its total end strength of Marines from 186,000 to 202,000 in order to sustain combat operations in two theaters (Iraq and Afghanistan). By 2008, and as major combat operations began to shift toward war/peace time transition and drawdown, the Marine Corps received the warning order from DOD surmising that the Marine Corps needed to begin the plan to reduce its organizational structure back to an economy of force organization. Although there has not been an actual number, senior officials have projected a reduction back to a 182,000 Marine Force.

During the buildup, minority numbers in the officer category did not increase. Frankly, the percentage of African American officers reduced back to 1970s percentages. By 2010, the problem magnified to the Congressional and Department of Defense Level. The concern within “The Beltway” was if the military as a whole possessed enough diversity within its tenet services to reflect the nation. The only service that did was the Army at 13%. The United States Marine Corps was the smallest at 5.6%. As of October 18, 2011,³⁹ the percentage for African American Marine Corps officers was 5.1% for men and 0.5% for female. In order to meet the over 5.6% assessment, the Marine Corps had to include Warrant Officers in its officer category, where as other services did not include this number in their officer category.

The programs to integrate the Marine Corps officer ranks in the 1970s were a good start. Initiatives such as the MOSO and the minority recruitment boards of this time period were effective because of their methods of targeting. Post civil rights integrations

with multiple programs and universities were still new. The target pool were the HCBUs where any organization could find minority men and women who could meet the minimum requirements. The Marine Corps first generation of African American general officers received their college education from either a HBCU or the United States Naval Academy.

However, because of the successful increase of African American officers, the Marine Corps had to manage a much larger dynamic in the 1980s, which was an additional demand for this, and Hispanic officers. In the 1980s, critical programs such as MOSO and minority recruitment boards were believed to be obsolete because of the over estimation of civil rights issues being resolved in the United States. This poor assessment from both the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense misled both organizations into lumping all minority ethnic groups into one category in the 1980s. The Marine Corps assumed that the African American problem was well on its way to being solved now that society seemed to have moved pass “Jim Crow.”

In the 1980s, this was far from the truth. The United States attempted to move forward on a number of social issues. Although domestic and social issues in the United States were not as severe as “Jim Crow”, there were still a number of racially based social issues that the country needed to tackle such as education and economic improvement. Because of the shift from separate minority categories for Hispanics, Asians, and African Americans to one minority category for all non-Caucasians, the numbers of recruitment of specific minorities suffered. With the consolidation of minority programs originally at the community level into the HQMC level and the

consolidation of ethnicities into one lump category, the accession percentages began to decrease.

The Marine Corps still continued to rely heavily on the HCBUs as a source for minority officers during a time period where social and domestic change occurred within the universities. More African Americans were seeking opportunities for education outside of the HCBUs and the numbers of minorities in attendance at the United States Naval Academy began to increase. By maintaining the preponderance of the focus on HCBUs, the Marine Corps limited other prospects at other universities. The Marine Corps also competed with other civilian corporate organizations that were also “fishing” in the same HBCU pool. This limited the potential officer candidates and caused the Marine Corps to suffer a reduction on quality numbers. In short, the Marine Corps should have expanded its MOSO plan from the 1970s to other universities beyond the HCBUs. Because of the consolidated programs and efforts rather than expansion, accession numbers suffered.

The 1990s did not help with the social push for Affirmative Action, which provided a false sense of security by choosing quantity over quality. Assessment in the number of minorities failing out of OCS and TBS point to the lack of or assumption of risk by not recruiting at major universities and maintaining the focus at HCBUs and smaller colleges that catered to the African American Community. In smaller colleges, the academics may meet the minimum standard for national accreditation, but how did they compare with major universities that possess American mainstream recognition? In an interview with Colonel Royal Mortensen, USMC (Director of Command and Staff College and former Commanding Officer TBS) there was a discussion regarding

performance at both OCS and TBS. During his tenure as a Platoon Commander and Executive Officer at OCS and Commanding Officer at TBS, he noted that students or candidates who had difficulty in grasping the Program of Instruction (POI) usually came from small minimum accredited colleges that could not compete at the same level as a major universities. Therefore how does a candidate from “small-town community college” compete with a candidate from a “state university” or “major university”?

There are a number of ways to tackle this growing issue. The importance and reason for establishing a long-term diversity-recruiting plan concerns the country’s ever-changing demographics. According to a study by Virtcom Consulting, “United States demographics are and will continue to undergo radical shifts in minority composition. By 2050, Ethnic Minorities will be the Majority population.”⁴⁰ In the Predecisional Draft of From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century, the document assessed that “Hispanics, non-Hispanics blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented among recent Marine Corps Officer Accessions.”⁴¹ The Committee recommended improvement in recruiting methods by⁴²: creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographics group; creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups; developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs; and closely examining the prep school admissions processes and making required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.

Their recommendations can benefit the Marine Corps’ recruiting measures. In regards to the first recommendation, a strategic plan with a tactical/business hybrid

approach may be beneficial. Major General Ronald Bailey, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division and former MCRC Commanding General, as well as multiple RSCOs stated, “Recruiting is a Counterinsurgency (COIN) fight.” The Marine Corps operational forces have been tackling COIN for the last 10 years in Iraq and Afghanistan with a great deal of success. Although there have been stress points along the way, overall the Marine Corps has done relatively well. Why not bring the operational planning and approach to the Marine Corps recruiting side in a formal manner.

By going through a modified planning process, the Marine Corps Planning Process that fits the recruiting model, MCRC will see some tangible benefits in recruiting. In the area of Campaign Design, MCRC can use the Army’s TRADOC pamphlet 525-5-500 (Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design). When reading this document, there are techniques that are interchanged with a COIN environment and society. With initial planning for a minority recruiting campaign, the pamphlet offers the following tenets for campaign intent⁴³: Problem, Purpose, Key Objectives, Priorities, Risk, and End state. After prosecuting these various charts, this paper will offer ways that provide examples of how this approach can be used to facilitate the recruiting process. When tackling problem framing and design, the pamphlet offers the following charts⁴⁴:

	Well-Structured “Puzzle”	Medium-Structured “Structurally Complex Problem”	Ill-Structured “Wicked Problem”
Problem Structuring	The problem is self-evident. Structuring is trivial.	Professionals easily agree on its structure.	Professionals will have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared starting hypothesis.
Solution Development	There is only one right solution. It may be difficult to find.	There may be more than one “right” answer. Professionals may disagree on the best solution. Desired end state can be agreed.	Professionals will disagree on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How the problem can be solved. • The most desirable end state. • Whether it can be attained.
Execution of Solution	Success requires learning to perfect technique.	Success requires learning to perfect technique and adjust solution.	Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust solution, and refine problem framing.
Adaptive Iteration	No adaptive iteration required.	Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution.	Adaptive iteration is required both to refine problem structure and to find the best solution.

Figure 1-1. Types of Problems and Solution Strategies

Designing	Engineering
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Problem-framing – Start with a blank sheet – Questions the limits of existing knowledge – Questions assumptions and method – Conceptual – Develops understanding – Paradigm setting – Complements planning, preparation, and assessment – Output: a broad approach to problem solving (a design) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Problem-solving – Start with a coherent design or plan – Functions within the existing paradigm – Follows established procedure – Physical and detailed – Develops products – Paradigm accepting – Patterns and templates activity – Output: detailed plan for action (blueprints)

Figure 1-2. A Comparison of the Cognitive Processes in Designing and Engineering




Figure 1-3. Military Planning




Figure 2-1. Problem Framing Tasks




Figure 2-2. Mission Analysis Tasks




Figure 3-1. Campaign Design Tasks

With the use of these processes, there are systematic approaches to tackling minority recruiting. With campaign design, the commander can utilize the staff at the

District and above level to design the campaign with this process. It would be advisable to include RSCOs in the planning process since the majority of them bring to the table experience as Operations Officers from the Fleet Marine Force. Campaign Design allows the commander and staffs to critically think about the problem. The known problem is the fact that the Marine Corps has a low number of African American officers. The next step in problem framing is why does the Marine Corps have a low percentage of African American officers and why is the community not producing more potential candidates. This goes back to the original question, which is if this is an organizational problem or a cultural/community problem. Both lines of thinking indicate that this issue could be a “wicked problem”⁴⁵ or a “structurally complex problem.”⁴⁶ Once the problem has been addressed, the next steps in campaign design will enable the commanders and staffs to continue their analysis, which will lead to planning, coordinating, and allocating the proper resources needed for targeting the problem.

While conducting planning, a modified targeting matrix such as D3A from a MCRC perspective or lens will aid in the second recommendation made by the Diversity Committee. Factors such as intelligence, high value targets, high pay off targets, and non-kinetic fire support in the form of information operations (IO) are just as important in gaining the support of the community as they are on the battlefield. Items such as aviation assets, cyber, and electromagnetic activities can be substituted with assets that are relevant to recruiting which may be monetary resources and officer recruiting/accesion programs. Provided is the MDMP D3A targeting analysis chart⁴⁷:

Table 1-1. Crosswalk of operations process, joint targeting cycle, D3A, and MDMP

Operations Process		Joint Targeting Cycle	D3A	MDMP	Targeting Task
Continuous Assessment	Planning	1. The End State and Commanders Objectives	Decide	Mission Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perform target value analysis to develop fire support (including cyber/electromagnetic and inform/influence activities) high-value targets. • Provide fire support, inform/influence, and cyber/electromagnetic activities input to the commander's targeting guidance and desired effects.
		2. Target Development and Prioritization		Course of Action Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designate potential high-payoff targets. • Deconflict and coordinate potential high-payoff targets. • Develop high-payoff target list. • Establish target selection standards. • Develop attack guidance matrix. • Develop fire support and cyber/electromagnetic activities tasks. • Develop associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
		3. Capabilities Analysis		Course of Action Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refine the high-payoff target list. • Refine target selection standards. • Refine the attack guidance matrix. • Refine fire support tasks. • Refine associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. • Develop the target synchronization matrix. • Draft airspace control means requests.
		4. Commander's Decision and Force Assignment		Orders Production	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalize the high-payoff target list. • Finalize target selection standards. • Finalize the attack guidance matrix. • Finalize the targeting synchronization matrix. • Finalize fire support tasks. • Finalize associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. • Submit information requirements to S-2.
	Preparation	5. Mission Planning and Force Execution	Detect		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execute ISR Plan. • Update information requirements as they are answered. • Update the high-payoff target list, attack guidance matrix, and targeting synchronization matrix. • Update fire support and cyber/electromagnetic activities tasks. • Update associated measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.
	Execution	6. Assessment	Deliver		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execute fire support and electronic attacks in accordance with the attack guidance matrix and the targeting synchronization matrix.
			Assess		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess task accomplishment (as determined by measures of performance). • Assess effects (as determined by measures of effectiveness).

Targeting allows the commander to allocate the appropriate resources in right areas in order to achieve the end state. MCRC targeting will enable the Marine Corps to look at underrepresented areas from events within the community to colleges that are rarely visited by OSOs. There are a substantial amount of colleges that have untapped resources of competitive colleges students who may not know about the opportunities in becoming a Marine Corps Officer. The first piece of intelligence to gather demographic

data and academic statistics is the News Week College rankings. By assessing the results and categories within the Newsweek data, this information can be processed and added into the targeting cycle.

Line of Operation Design⁴⁸ (LOO) also can contribute to the planning model. In the operating environment, the LOOs consist of Security, Economics, Governance, and Essential Services. In the recruiting model, the LOOs could be Economics (Community Based - Location), Governance (Local City Council and Congressional Representative), Essential Educational Programs, and Military Contact (Outreach). Military Contact is like security in LOO design. Before you accomplish any other LOO, security has to be established. For Military Contact, there needs to be a non-hostile familiarity with the community. Stereotypical and cultural biases in both the military and the community must be neutralized. After contact has been established, the Districts and Recruiting Stations can prioritize each LOO based on the area they serve. LOO design can complement or work hand in hand with Major General Bailey's "Whole Community Approach" in gaining attraction for minorities to seek out the Marine Corps. Provided is another model for LOO design based on different non traditional lines:

elders, the older professionals and community leaders can help turn the tide and steer the younger generation of minority college students and future professionals toward potential military service in the Marine Corps. Based on a survey taken by a selected audience, some of the IO messages that countered Marine Corps messaging to increase diversity consisted of⁴⁹:

- 1) Q: What do you know about Marine Corps Officer Programs?
A: Very little, from conversations there are two standards, one for African Americans, and one for all others.
- 2) Q: Do you think past history in military service has affected the African American Community to steer its children away from seeking officer commissions in the Marine Corps or any service for that matter?
A: Yes
- 3) Q: Do you feel community leaders are/are not advocating service in the Marine Corps, Army, Navy or Air Force?
A: Yes, there is no interest.

These questions came from a prominent leader within the African American community who happens to be the NAACP District Leader for Alameda, California. It is also important to note that this community leader is in her late 60s/early 70s, which means she experienced a considerable amount of ethnic challenges as a minority. Her generation may express some level of scrutiny toward anything government or military for that matter. She believed that a low percentage of African American officers in the Marine Corps is an organizational problem.

In order to dispute these comments, we can look at Major General Arnold Field as an example. Major General Fields grew up in the “Jim Crow” state of South Carolina. He grew up working in the fields and was treated harshly at times. He attended a HCBU and became a teacher prior to joining the Marine Corps. Like so many other young men during his time, he was drafted into the military to serve in Vietnam. Initially he was directed to report to the Army for enlistment. The Marine Corps offered him a better

opportunity and a commission as an officer upon completion of OCS. He became as infantry officer who saw combat in Vietnam. After he completed his obligation of service, he remained in the Marine Corps rather than exit the service. When asked, why he stayed, he replied, “The Marine Corps offered a better lifestyle and opportunity for me. If I got out, I would be returning to the world that I grew up in. I would not have realized my true potential.”⁵⁰

Arnold Fields retired as one of the select members of the Marine Corps who earned the rank as a general officer. He faced adversity with determination and drive which rewarded him with success. He was placed on the front page of the publication *Pride, Progress, and Prospects* along with Major General Clifford Stanley, Major General Charles Bolden, and Major General Leo Williams. With the right IO messaging in LOO design, these IO countering MCRC progress can be defeated.

There are organizational issues that also limit the ability to counter IO and execute the mission affectively. There were numerous surveys taken in order to gain data concerning the low minority numbers. As leaders and planners, the assessments from the data must be questioned and validated within and beyond the organization. There were two survey/analysis reports conducted in order to provide the Marine Corps with an understanding on what needed to happen in order to improve diversity. The first report came from the Center of Naval Analysis (CNA) and the other came from the Joint Advertising Marketing Research and Studies group (JAMRS). Both reports provide data from selected audiences and selected universities, which limit scope. The assessments provide a bleaker outcome.

CNA⁵¹ analysis targeted the qualifications from an academic and medical standpoint with the following assessments:

QCP adjusted for medical qualifications and propensity (preliminary)

Institution	Black male QCP	Propensed Black male QCP	Medically fit Black male QCP	Propensed and medically fit
Morehouse College	277	27	216	21
Florida A&M	272	26	213	20
Univ. of Maryland-College Park	254	24	201	19
Florida State Univ.	247	24	194	18
Florida International Univ.	232	22	181	17
Howard Univ.	228	22	181	17
Univ. of Central Florida	218	21	170	16
Univ. of Florida	215	20	168	16
Ohio State Univ.	194	20	144	15
Georgia State Univ.	192	18	150	14
Univ. of South Florida	190	18	149	14



Black males have lower estimated medical qualification rates than either white or Hispanic males in 42 states.

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Concluding remarks

- QCP continues to be highly concentrated—the top one percent of schools contain 12 percent of the nation's QCP
- The medically adjusted and propensed QCP is *much* smaller than the unadjusted QCP
- The schools with the largest black or Hispanic QCP are not the schools with the largest total male QCP
- There are significant differences in continuation behavior, selection rates, and OCS attrition rates across racial/ethnic groups—future work should examine the root of these differences
- Slight evidence that recruiting to the face of the nation may be more difficult when the economy is strong



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The JAMRS⁵² study assessed the following results:

Race/Ethnicity-Specific Summary: Black Parents

SUMMARY: Black parents in particular talk to their CB/E child very frequently about their future. However, they rarely talk about the Military, let alone the officer career path, partly because they simply don't know much about officer training programs and don't see it as a prestigious career. They want their child to have a reputable, honorable job where they can express their independence and help others. Unfortunately, Black parents don't associate these outcomes with being an officer. They associate becoming an officer with wars they disapprove of and death/injury. Black parents highly value input from their family and community when it comes to making decisions about their child. But by and large, Black parents believe that these people wouldn't be supportive of their child becoming an officer. Together, these factors provoke notably high levels of fear, anger, and even disgust if their CB/E child said they wanted to become a Military officer.

▪ **Recommendations:**

- ✓ Differentiate the Officer Corps and clearly portray it as a prestigious, competitive career path that fits with the goals and aspirations Black parents have for their children.
- ✓ Share the positive attitudes and emotions other parents of Black officers have had about their child's choice to serve as a Military officer.
- ✓ Demonstrate that Black officers experience independence and personal satisfaction from being in charge of important decisions in their role as an officer.
- ✓ It is essential to reach out to a wide number of community influencers that Black parents turn to when making decisions about their child's future.
- ✓ Work to reduce feelings of anger and disgust among this group by correcting misinformation, and providing an honest, realistic assessment of the officer career path.

Source: JAMRS Minority Officer Study Guardian Survey

JAMRS

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From these results and recommendations, the data indicated a bleaker picture for the recruiting model. These surveys gathered data from well known and frequently used sources. When seeking analysis from universities, the assessors surveyed from well known universities. The leader/planner should look at universities or institutions where data was not gathered in order to glean a better picture. *Newsweek* provide numerous institutions beyond the HBUs and larger mainstream universities. If one were to look at other top contending liberal arts colleges outside of these parameters, one might find a wealth of prospects that meet the qualifications for OCS and ROTC programs.

In response to the Diversity Committee's third and fourth recommendations regarding service ROTC and academy programs, ROTC and academy application

processes should be more aligned. Individuals who may not receive an appointment to the Naval Academy should be considered for a NROTC scholarship. This means if the Admissions Board denies an appointment, then the applicant could automatically get screened for a NROTC program. Most academy applicants get accepted to other universities and graduate successfully. This is an untapped resource for minority candidates.

Another concern is the preparatory programs. There are limited numbers of seats for the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS), however, the BOOST program was recently cancelled thus limiting both the Navy and Marine Corps to offer college preparation courses for both enlisted and high school candidates. The Marine Corps is confined to MCEP and ECP for the enlisted and PLC for college students. If the Marine Corps funds a college preparation program similar to BOOST, more opportunities to provide access to commissioning programs for minorities who may lack the requisite skills to succeed at OCS and TBS.

Colonel Calvert Worth wrote an article, “Looking in All the Wrong Places: One Solution To Improving Diversity In the Officer Corps” regarding officer recruitment. He stated,

The Nation’s high schools provide an endless source of minority candidates and should become “shared territory” for recruiters as well as OSOs. In doing so, the number of potential candidates will grow without diminishing the numbers of potential enlistees.⁵³

This increases flexibility of the recruiting stations and does not limit OSOs to the college campuses. With the decreased number of enlistments in the upcoming months to come, recruiters can maintain an engaging effort with high school students and assist the

OSO in finding potential candidates for NROTC programs and maintain contact with future college students for potential application to PLC.

The final recommendation for increasing minority officer representation is the shaping of Marine Corps career potential. Most African American officers serve in the supporting arms communities. Very few serve in the more career enhancing MOSs. The support MOS structure limit opportunities to serve in command billets, therefore limiting career progression. There is a social stigma to serve in technical jobs such as communications or logistics because they provide tangible job skills in the civilian sector. The reality is combat Arms billets demand a lot more than tactical prowess. Today's infantry officer or aviator does more than pull a trigger or fly an airframe. Aviators have collateral duties in communications, aviation maintenance, and logistics while infantry officers train and advise host nation forces, conduct and chair host nation city council meetings, and manage millions of dollars in military equipment. These skills after 20 to 30 years of military service lead to jobs in fortune 500 companies. As they advance in their career as staff officers, combat arms officers chair operational planning teams (OPT) that are equivalent to large firms conducting corporate merges. Both of these jobs determine the future of employees, investors, and the organization's success. Therefore, the Marine Corps should use these leaders to influence potential officer candidates. A way to do this is to offer a program similar to recruiter's assistance to junior officers in their hometowns to talk to local colleges and community forums. Additionally, senior officers in command billets should take the opportunity to attend local community forums, job fairs, and college functions in order to advertise Marine Corps officer programs to minorities.

The Marine Corps, under the guidance of Manpower created a program called the Marine Leadership Development Seminar (MLDS) that travels to well-known universities and career fairs with a large minority representation in order to educate the students on officer career opportunities in the Marine Corps. Program such as the MLDS cover the tip of the iceberg. The next challenge is to get the active duty officers and commanders to gain entry in the universities as honored guests and potentially provide graduation commencement addresses or guest lecture in socio-political courses in order to increase exposure of the Marine Corps.

Another method in planning is to establish a task organization similar to the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) within MCRC. If the RSCOs align with district representatives as civilian counterparts, this structure will enable more involvement within the communities. By having civilian leaders or representative aligned with RSCOs, they can provide information and requirements regarding minority recruitment. The civilian counterparts are the possible link between the community and the Marine Corps. Similar to Iraq or Afghanistan, a military solution was insufficient to providing stability and job opportunity within the battle space. However, with the integration of Department of State officials, a fresh approach to stabilizing the battle space provided positive feedback and renewed opportunity to peace. This type of civilian integration can only aid in attaining positive feedback and support within the minority communities because they will see not only a military face, but a civilian face collectively trying to achieve the same goal.

CONCLUSION:

There are three issues that Marine Corps could do to increase the recruitment of African Americans into the officer corps. First, the Marine Corps should aggressively mentor young African American officers at TBS to seek the combat arms MOS in order to increase career progression. Second, seek out more African Americans outside of the HBCUs by analyzing Newsweek's college report. The third recommendation is establishing similar initiatives like the MOSO programs to interface with the African American community in order to increase exposure of the Marine Corps officer programs and educate the community.

The Marine Corps is facing a challenging time in 2012. While reducing the organization's end strength to stabilize at approximately 182,000 personnel, the Marine Corps at the direction of the Commandant directed MCRC to increase the representation of minorities (specifically African Americans). Meeting this goal requires innovative thinking and flexible campaign planning. Through analysis of historical challenges, integration programs, and recommendations to different approaches, this research paper sought to expose the problems both the African American community and the organization faced up to this point in time.

Both facets (organization and community) experienced triumph and adversity. This is a critical point where both facets need to break away from traditional thought processes and overcome bias in order to bridge the gap. Both are culpable and both are accountable for the future of the Marine Corps minority population. If the senior community leaders cannot look past the racial injustices, then barriers will continue to exist. The Marine Corps also needs to expand its endeavors and be critical to the agencies

that provide data based on cultural beliefs regarding military service. Endeavors such as honoring the Montford Point Marines and implementing their history into the Marine Corps PME program is a good start, but there is a lot more work yet to be done. The Marine Corps should continue to invest in mentoring and developing its minority officers who currently serve so they can aid in building the minority structure within the organization. This should start at OCS and TBS and continue throughout their career. Finally, as with combat operations and operational strategic planning, recruiting and proper force structural planning will provide the Marine Corps with a lifetime of success and prosperity as a premier fighting force in readiness, which is one of many feats the Marine Corps prides itself in.

APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A: HISTORICAL BACK GROUND

APPENDIX B: OFFICER ACCESSION DATA

APPENDIX C: LETTER REGARDING DIVERSITY

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The current shortfall of a low percentage of African Americans serving as Commissioned Officers in the Marine Corps stems socially before President Franklin D. Roosevelt enacted his Executive Order 8802. In order to understand the current situation, one must understand the history, which contributes to this problem.

Since the United States' fight for independence, African Americans continuously lent their efforts to United States war machine, but the fruits of their contribution were not realized or captured effectively to stimulate enough patriotism within the African American culture. As stated in Blacks in the Military – Studies in Defense Policy authored by the Brookings Institution:

The Black Experience in the American armed forces has likewise been marked by policies of exclusion during periods of peace and expedient acceptance during the mobilization for war. Although blacks have taken part in all of our nation's wars, the armed forces openly sustained the indignities and humiliation, the discrimination, and the stereotypes of racial inferiority until the middle of the twentieth century.⁵⁴

This statement echoes through out every American war or conflict leading up to Vietnam conflict when integration was complete with every armed force component. These historical facts left an imprint on the services, which continue to haunt past and present efforts to increase officer recruitment in three of the four military branches.

THE EARLY COLONIAL YEARS.

The first initial participation of African Americans dates back to the 1600s. The colonies allowed every man, free or slave, to take up arms in defense against incursions from American Indians, European transgressors, and anyone that threatened the peace of the colonies. Concern amongst the colonialist surmised that such a capability within the

African American Slave populous could result in slave uprisings. As a result for this potential threat, policies were put in place excluding the training or inclusion of African Americans in any duties as militiamen. Eventually, limited provisions were made allowing African Americans to serve in limited roles. The Brookings Institution stated, “The first such provision was instituted in 1639 by the colony of Virginia. In 1656, Massachusetts passed a similar measure, and in 1661, four years after an uprising of blacks and Indians in Hartford, Connecticut followed suit. The other colonies later restricted the participation of blacks in military affairs – ‘lest our slaves when armed might become our masters’”⁵⁵ These stipulations afforded African Americans the opportunity to serve only in menial or supporting roles such as fifers, drummers, or laborers. They were no longer authorized to bear arms in defense of the colonies. But in later colonial years transitioning into war against Britain, a necessity for fighters would outweigh the stipulations of race or social class.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

During the American Revolutionary War, African Americans, both slaves and free men, were initially denied the opportunity to contribute in the profession of arms because they were deemed an inferior race. It is important to note however, that Crispis Attucks, a free African American colonist was recorded as the first American to suffer death at the hands of the British Redcoats during the Boston Massacre, making him one of the first American casualties of the Revolutionary War. What was not emphasized enough was the aspect that Crispis Attucks was not the only African American who contributed to the American Revolution. African Americans initially served as militiamen against the British in engagements at Lexington, Concord, Ticonderoga, and Bunker

Hill⁵⁶. However, drawing back to the previous concern of racial inferiority, slave holders and supremacists believed that African Americans serving in the role as militiamen or professional soldiers provided a potential threat to their interests in the form of possible slave uprisings and insurrection. Additionally, as a slave, who possesses no rights, one would assume that it was morally wrong to share in the burden of the American revolutionary cause.

The first official federal mandate was enacted by the Continental Congress and General George Washington;

In response to these pressures and with the support of the Continental Congress, General George Washington issued an order in 1775 prohibiting any new enlistments of blacks (but allowing blacks who were already in the army to remain here).⁵⁷

In order to counter the Colonialist's effort against the British Crown, England offered African American slaves an opportunity to bear arms against the Americans by promising freedom when England ended the American revolution on their terms. After gaining knowledge of England's efforts to recruit slaves and assessing their own critical resource shortfalls of combat power, the Continental Congress allowed African Americans who were not slaves to enlist in the Continental Army. Out of necessity and without official authorization from the Continental Congress, colonies took it upon their own interest to seek out free African Americans to enlist;

Rhode Island, in desperate need of able-bodied fighters, even authorized the formation of an all black battalion, the members of which were guaranteed freedom and equal pay and benefits.⁵⁸

Other implemented measures were the substitute draftee policy. This policy allowed colonialists who were selected to serve to substitute their place with an African American slave. By the end of the Revolutionary War, "an estimated 5000 blacks,

including those with the Continental navy, the state navies, and privateers, fought with the colonial forces of the American Revolution.”⁵⁹ Regardless of their contributions or sacrifices, African American efforts were quickly marginalized after the completion of the war. The newly established American government mandated that African Americans be “barred” from serving in any militias or armed forces of the United States. According to the Marine Corps Publication, “Blacks in the Marine Corps”,

The Secretary of War, who also supervised the Navy, on 16 March 1798 prescribed a set of rules governing the enrollment of Marines for the Constellation which provided that no Negro, Mulatto or Indian to be enlisted.⁶⁰

Major William Ward Burrows, the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1798 directed,

You must be careful not to enlist more foreigners than as one to three natives. You can make use of Blacks and Mulattos while you recruit, but you cannot enlist them.⁶¹

There was minimal participation from African Americans in the War of 1812, but African Americans would not be afforded the opportunity to serve their country until the Civil War.

THE CIVIL WAR AND PRE WWI.

In the beginning of the Civil War, the Lincoln Administration excluded African Americans to serve in the military in order to secure the loyalty of “border states” thus ensuring the preservation of the Union. Another concern that the administration initially had was that the implementation of African Americans in the services would create animosity and dissention amongst the troops thus affecting any possible volunteering of Caucasian Americans in the Union Army. To that end, African Americans were not initially sought out for recruitment until 1862. Because of the dwindling numbers of Caucasian Americans volunteering for enlistment in the Union Army, Union Generals

without any Federal approval began recruitment of African Americans. During that same year, there were enough African American volunteers to establish regiments of color. When President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, the Federal Government authorized public and active efforts for African Americans to serve in the Union Army. The earliest known minority-recruiting agency for the military was The Bureau of Colored Troops. The bureau successfully recruited and organized for military service over 185,000 African Americans. According to the Brookings Institution: Blacks accounted for 9 to 10 percent of the Union Army and one-quarter enlistments in the Navy (which officially authorized black enlistments in 1861). When black volunteers in independent and state units are included, it is estimated that close to 390,000 blacks served in the Civil War.⁶²

By the end of the war, an estimated 38,000 African Americans sacrificed their lives in battle, which was 40% higher than Caucasian Americans fighting in the war. The Brookings Institution also identified that “the largest number of deaths in any single outfit in the Union Army occurred in the Fifth United States Colored Heavy Brigade, where 829 soldiers died.”⁶³

After the Civil War, Congress authorized six African American Regiments comprised of two infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments. Led by Caucasian American officers, these units contributed to the Indian Wars and performed their duties equally on the American frontier and western outposts. African American Cavalry units under General John Pershing were utilized in pursuit of the renegade Pancho Villa to support the charge up San Juan Hill during the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916-1917. Because of minimal promise of improvement in quality of life post Civil War, most African Americans gravitated toward military service in these Regiments. However, the possibility of enlisting decreased as vacancies were few and far in between. These

regiments would not be utilized except in the case of a “national emergency.” Because of these criteria, African Americans could not seek service in any other branch but the United States Army.

Prior to World War I, African Americans continued to face adversity within the United States due to unequal treatment regardless of their military status. The first major incident of questionable treatment was the Brownsville Affray in Brownsville, Texas where African Americans stationed there ensued a riot due to unfair treatment by the local residents. In the end, “President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the dishonorable discharge of three black companies without trial by court-marshal. The 167 black soldiers-some with career level service (up to twenty seven years) and citations for bravery, and six with the Medal of Honor- were discharged without honor, back pay, allowances, benefits, pensions, or the chance to gain federal employment of any kind.”⁶⁴

A similar incident in Houston, Texas, known as the Houston Riots resulted from an altercation between the local residents, policemen, and African American soldiers. Several policemen and citizens were killed in the process. In return, the War Department “indicted” 118 African American soldiers and convicted 110, which lead to 19 men being secretly hanged and 63 imprisoned for a life term.

WORLD WAR I.

At the onset of World War I, the general population of African Americans in the United States was 10.7%. The Selective Service’s mission was to ensure that this figure reflected the draft percentage. The African American community displayed specific interest in serving in war as a possibility to invoke social change. The Brookings Institution quoted W.E.B. Dubois, the founder of the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), “if the black man could fight to defeat the Kaiser...he could later present a bill for payment due to a grateful white America.”⁶⁵

In the end few were allowed to enlist and most were drafted into the war serving in menial support roles such as “supply, stevedore, engineer, or labor crews⁶⁶.”

Therefore, when researching the jobs of 200,000 African American soldiers serving in World War I, eight out of ten men served in service support roles such as laborers. Within the combat units, critics relentlessly questioned the effectiveness of African Americans in combat. An incident that ensued criticism was the 368th Regiment of the 92nd Buffalo Division where the unit fell back to the rear during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive on September 26, 1918. Under the French Command however, the 369th Infantry Regiment received accolades in regards to their performance. The French Commander noted, “They never lost a prisoner, a trench, or a foot of ground during the 191 days of fire, longer than any other American unit.”⁶⁷ President Truman under his term acknowledged the problems within the 92nd and took into the account the performance of the 369th agreeing with the French’s assessment as “100 percent all right”. During this period only one percent of African Americans served in the United States Navy and none in the United States Marine Corps. After the Armistice, the Navy began recruiting Philippine nationals therefore stopping African American enlistment. Of the few who remained in the Navy served only in a mess man or steward status. The Army remained segregated and with the introduction of the Army Air Corps, African Americans were also denied the opportunity to serve in the new branch. Additionally, only five African Americans were commissioned officers in which three were chaplains.

WORLD WAR II.

During this period of military history, social and political pressure began to increase within the United States to break the color barrier. The Selective Service initiated the first administrative effort at the onset of World War II. “The Selective Service Training and Service Act of 1940 reflected those who promoted equality of service by stipulating that the selection of volunteers and draftees for the armed forces should not discriminate against any person on account of race or color⁶⁸.” This administrative initiative applied to both ground and naval forces, but it also allowed the service components to establish their own standards for enlistment and qualification without any defined parameters for placement of personnel.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt enunciated the administrative initiative from the War Department. The Brookings Institution outlined from President Roosevelt⁶⁹: the proportion on Blacks in the Army would be equivalent to the proportion of Blacks in the general population; Black units would be established in each branch (combatant and noncombatant); and Blacks would be allowed to attend officer candidate schools so they could serve as pilots in black aviation units. (The Tuskegee Airmen)

The Army never reached its goal of reflecting the percentage within the general population. The Army accepted the fact the same social problems within the civilian community carried over into the organization. The Army argued that the military should not be an experiment for social shifts in segregation and would threaten unit efficiency, morale, and discipline. This stance on forced social reform within the Army depicted African Americans as a liability rather than a force multiplier.

These issue self-induced restraints on training and recruitment required African Americans to receive training in locations less disruptive to the social dynamics of

segregation. The Army established separate training facilities, equipment, and training personnel in order to meet the demand of African Americans entering the war. Initially, both the Navy and Marine Corps dodged this concern by not seeking any enlistment of African Americans.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 8802, 25 JUNE 1942⁷⁰ AND GILLEM REPORT.

On 25 June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the recruitment of African Americans under the Fair Labor and Recruitment Act. This order directed that the Navy and Marine Corps had to comply. Frankly, the Army could support being the sole source for African Americans to serve fulfilling the right to fight for their country. The Navy complied by allowing African Americans to serve in the capacity as stewards and cooks. The Marine Corps followed the Army's model of establishing separate facilities and equipment. The first African American Marines to serve in the Marine Corps would earn the Eagle, Globe, and Anchors at Montford Point, South Carolina.

By 1944 the casualty rates began to affect combat operations requiring a "call to arms" for African Americans to see combat action. Measures were taken within the Army to place African Americans within infantry units that would fight within regular Army Regiments. This would serve two purposes: offer African Americans an opportunity to fight in the war at a reduction in rank; and regular Army Infantry units could be pulled off the line for rest and refit and replaced by the African American Units.

Similar to World War I, African Americans fell under scrutiny in respect to their ability to fight in combat. According to the Special Board on Negro Manpower, a board of officers under Lieutenant General Avlan Gillem USA, "all black" troops demonstrated the poorest performance in action. However, the board provided additional observations

that “all black platoons within white companies” fought more effectively. The Gillem Report concluded that poor performance was “in part of the Army’s poor preparation and planning.”⁷¹ Attitudes of Caucasian American officers assigned to African American units were resentful, which lead to the belief that these assignments would stagnate career progression. The problem only magnified adversity when the Army placed officers of southern origin within these units.

The Chief Historian of the Army in 1945 wrote:

American Negro troops are, as you know, ill-educated on the average and often illiterate; they lack self-respect, self-confidence, and initiative; they tend to be very conscious of their low standing in the eyes of the white population and consequently feel very little motive for aggressive fighting. In fact, their survival as individuals and as a people has often depended on their ability to subdue completely even the appearance of aggressiveness. After all, when a man knows that the color of his skin will automatically disqualify him for reaping the fruits of attainment it is no wonder that he sees little point in trying very hard to excel anybody else. To me, the most extraordinary thing is that such people continue trying at all.⁷²

In essence, Army professionals and assessors argued that substandard expectations and treatment greatly affected the performance of African Americans. One could not expect first class performance from citizens who were treated or seen as 2nd or 3rd class citizens in society and within the military. The statistics for African Americans seeking to serve in World War II were⁷³:

Draft Registration: 2.5 Million

Army Service: 909,000 – 78% in Support MOS, 8.7% of the Army

Naval Service: 167,000, 95% in Support MOS, 4% of the Navy

Marine Corps Service: 17,000, 100% in Support MOS, 4% of the Marine Corps

The end of World War II processed all but 2500 African American Marines out of the Marine Corps. The 2500 that remained in the United States Marine Corps continued to serve in support roles such as cooks and stewards. In 1945 three African Americans sought to attend Officer Candidate School (OCS), but did not receive commissions.

Following the first three failures, Officer Candidate Frederick C. Branch completed OCS and became the first African American Marine Corps Officer. Upon commissioning, Branch was processed out of the Marine Corps. He was recalled for duty at the outbreak of the Korean War. Three others followed Branch's path in 1946.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981, 26 JULY 1948.⁷⁴

President Harry S. Truman, under pressure from the African American community, directed an executive order to completely end segregation within all of the armed forces. African Americans, despite adversity within the branches of service, maintained their desire to serve because the military provided better opportunities for their families and lifestyle compared to their civilian contemporaries. African Americans felt that their sacrifice and blood shed in the war would prove their right to be recognized as an equal citizen within American society.

FAHEY COMMITTEE, 1949.⁷⁵

Charles H. Fahy, under President Truman's Committee on Treatment and Opportunity, recommended the integration of units due to manpower costs of segregation. In particular, manpower shortages in White units were degrading combat effectiveness. The Fahey Committee urged the Army to move from a racial quota to an achievement quota. "The Army used the General Classification Test which was often used to adjust its qualification scores up and down and used its physical, psychiatric, and moral standards to effectively regulate the number of black enlistments. The Army could also make it difficult for Soldiers to reenlist if they were perennial low men or otherwise inapt."⁷⁶ The Marine Corps' answer to the executive order and the Fahy Committee was

the abolishment of segregation within its recruit training but maintained “all black” units within the Fleet Marine Force.

KOREAN WAR AND PROJECT CLEAR, 1951⁷⁷.

Project Clear was a seminal study of desegregation done by the Army in 1951. Leo Bogart was the author of the study that focused on attitudes of Blacks and Whites as it related to the service, each other, the mission, and jobs. The study concluded that racial segregation limited the effectiveness of the Army and that the Army should desegregate as quickly as possible. For the Marine Corps, manpower shortages and the small size of the Marine Corps made them the first service to integrate fighting units. Military necessity allowed for the quick integration of the Marine Corps.

At the onset of the Korean War, African Americans enlisted in large numbers while the services found shortages of Caucasian Americans seeking service. Project Clear benefited the services having racially integrated men. Studies indicated that integrated units were highly effective and combat performance between African Americans and Caucasian Americans were equal. By the end of the Korean War, the Pentagon announced the abolishment of segregated units within the Armed forces. The next issue for the military to tackle was the military-civilian relations regarding military installations within areas that exercised “Jim Crow” laws. Off base, African Americans had difficulty seeking proper or equal amenities or services, which caused racial tension.

GESSELL COMMITTEE REPORT, 1962.⁷⁸

The Gessell Committee, convened by President John F. Kennedy, addressed the off installation issues, which impacted the willingness of Blacks to serve as well as the Black quality of life within the service. The committee examined the “special efforts” and

methods to increase the presently inefficient flow of “qualified Negroes into the Armed Forces and the various factors that may have accounted for the fact that “participation of the Negro in the Armed forces is less than the percentage of Negroes in our total population.”⁷⁹ The final Gessell report was issued in 1964. This report is the first report since the Truman administration that detailed a quantitative picture of the relationship between Blacks and the military⁸⁰. In contrast to the two World Wars and the early days of the Korean War when Blacks had to “fight for the right to fight,” the advent of the Vietnam War brought charges that Blacks were doing more than their fair share of the fighting. This led to black leaders openly questioning the “special efforts” and methods that favored recruitment of Blacks over Whites. Between 1961 and 1966, when Blacks composed approximately 11% of the general population aged 19 – 21, Black casualties amounted to almost one fourth of all losses of Army enlisted personnel in Vietnam.

VIETNAM WAR AND THE MARSHALL COMMISSION⁸¹.

During the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights movement was the highlight of social reform, which affected the military’s profile on recruitment of African Americans. In an official Department of Defense Report, Blacks were more likely to be⁸²: drafted into the Armed Forces; be sent to Vietnam; serve in high-risk combat units; and consequently be killed or wounded in battle.

The Marshall Commission was tasked with investigating the accusations from the Black Community raising the concern that Blacks bore a disproportionate impact of the war and that institutional racism limited opportunities for Blacks. The focus of the report was to increase Black representation on the draft board to change the racial imbalance in those drafted. Daniel Moynihan⁸³ contended that the American Military had become an

immensely potent instrument for education and occupational mobility, but because of the overstated acceptance standards, Blacks and poor Whites were missing their chance to get in touch with American Society.

PROJECT 100,000, 1966-1969⁸⁴.

Approximately 246,000 recruits came into the military under this program. This program was intended to rehabilitate the nations “subterranean poor”. This program included the screening and admittance of 100,000 men who would otherwise be screened out of the military because of the limited educational background or low educational attainment. 40% of these men were Black. Almost 50% of the men were from the South, 47% were draftees. About 37% of the recruits were assigned to combat type skills and were sent to Vietnam. This served to further segregate the races, and thus Blacks found community not in the service but amongst themselves. By 1970, Black unrest had begun to hinder their fighting effort. Also, there was a growing fear among White officers that Black soldiers would turn their guns around and shoot them instead of the enemy.

Marine Corps publication Pride, Progress, and Prospect highlighted regarding tensions in the Marine Corps.⁸⁵: the protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins by black Americans as a sign of opposition to the segregationist policies in effect throughout the nation affecting employment, housing, and other civil issues; the 1963 March on Washington, D.C.; the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the assassination of Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis, Tennessee, in March 1968; the riots in response to the assassination of Dr. King; and the resurgence, growth, and symbols of "Black Power" in the neighborhoods, on college campuses, in the literature, poetry, and music of black America.

Racial tensions ensued within the Marine Corps during this period. The Brookings Institution stated that, “Serious racial clashes also beset the Marine Corps – in July 1969 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and in August 1969 at Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Honolulu.”⁸⁶

APPENDIX B

PRIDE PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS BLACK OFFICER ACCESSION DATA⁸⁷

Minority Officer Accession: 1972-1976 (Minority means Black Only)

Fiscal Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Total Accession Goal	1924	2325	1900	2275	2175
Black Goal	100	100	100	100	100
Percent of Accession Goal	5.2	4.3	5.3	4.4	4.6
Total Accessions	1763	2262	1927	2367	2193
Total Black Accessions	103	101	152	138	141
Percent of Total Accessions	5.8	4.5	7.9	5.8	6.4

Minority Officer Accession: 1977-1979 (Minority means Black and Hispanic)

Fiscal Year	1977	1978	1979
Minority Goal	2312	1850	1903
Percent of Accession Goal	185	174	174
Total Accessions	8.0	9.4	9.1
Total Minority Accessions	2022	1873	1919
Total Minority Accessions	145	143	126
Percent of Total Accessions	7.2	7.6	6.6

Black Officer Population as of 30 June 1971

Rank	Total – All Ethnicity	Total Black	Percentage of Total	Black Females
O-10	2	0	0.0	0
O-9	9	0	0.0	0
O-8	25	0	0.0	0
O-7	38	0	0.0	0
O-6	742	0	0.0	0
O-5	1638	3	0.2	0
O-4	3328	11	0.3	0
O-3	5609	59	1.1	1
O-2	6039	121	2.0	2
O-1	2485	40	1.6	2
Total	19915	234	1.2	5

Black Officer Population as of 30 September 1979

Rank	Total – All Ethnicity	Total Black	Percentage of Total	Black Females
O-10	2	0	0.0	0
O-9	7	0	0.0	0
O-8	23	0	0.0	0
O-7	33	0	0.0	0
O-6	576	1	0.2	0
O-5	1495	7	0.5	0
O-4	2668	36	1.3	1
O-3	4722	195	4.1	3
O-2	4446	259	5.8	8
O-1	2962	135	4.6	3
Total	16934	633	3.7	15

Black Officer Accession: 1983-1989

Fiscal Year	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Total Accession Goal	1890	1544	1443	1563	1364	1542	1458
Black Goal	95	93	87	94	82	93	87
Percent of Accession Goal	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Total Accessions	1890	1544	1443	1563	1364	1542	1458
Total Black Accessions	121	103	91	80	77	88	90
Percent of Total Accessions	6.4	6.7	6.3	5.1	5.6	5.7	6.2

Black Officer Population as of 30 September 1989

Rank	Total – All Ethnicity	Total Black	Percentage of Total	Black Females
O-10	2	0	0.0	0
O-9	8	0	0.0	0
O-8	25	0	0.0	0
O-7	35	0	0.0	0
O-6	642	9	1.4	0
O-5	1625	38	2.3	0
O-4	3226	141	4.4	6
O-3	6192	284	4.6	19
O-2	4110	255	6.2	10
O-1	2601	153	5.9	16
Total	18466	880	4.8	51

Black Officer Accession: 1990-1995

Fiscal Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Total Accession Goal	1404	1305	1350	1026	1204	1479
Black Goal	84	91	97	76	92	115
Percent of Accession Goal	6.0	7.0	7.2	7.4	7.6	7.8
Total Accessions	1404	1305	1350	1026	1204	1479
Total Black Accessions	66	60	77	73	95	110
Percent of Total Accessions	4.7	4.6	5.7	7.1	7.8	7.4

Black Officer Population as of 30 September 1995

Rank	Total – All Ethnicity	Total Black	Percentage of Total	Black Females
O-10	3	0	0.0	0
O-9	9	0	0.0	0
O-8	22	0	0.0	0
O-7	34	2	5.9	0
O-6	626	18	2.9	0
O-5	1637	73	4.5	5
O-4	3161	112	3.5	6
O-3	5457	249	4.6	11
O-2	2859	182	6.4	08
O-1	2044	165	8.1	13
Total	15852	801	5.1	43

Black Officer Accession Sources: 1991-1995

Fiscal Year Programs	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
OCC	35	42	23	13	42
PLC	30	21	38	48	25
NROTC	22	10	16	12	10
USNA	03	14	14	17	09
ENL	10	13	09	10	14

OCS Attrition Percentage Rates: Fall/Winter FY 1989-1993

	Fall – FY93	Winter - FY93	F/W AVG FY 89-92
Black	20	30	44
Hispanic	40	43	40
White	19	21	32
Other	25	50	47
Total	21	24	34

Officer Combat Arms Representation: 1992-1995

	White/Percent	Black/Percent	Hispanic/Percent	Other/Percent
1992	61.84%	38.65%	55.72%	61.67%
Total in OF	9358	291	258	231
Total Officers	15132	753	463	374
Total Aviators	4867	99	117	123
1993	58.10%	33.59%	51.03%	57.60%
Total in OF	9276	309	273	235
Total Officers	15965	920	535	408
Total Aviators	4785	108	124	123
1994	56.3%	33.57%	48.22%	54.44%
Total in OF	8964	332	285	233
Total Officers	15871	989	591	428
Total Aviators	4700	108	137	120
1995	56.75%	29.3%	40.65%	46.52%
Total in OF	8569	282	247	194
Total Officers	15098	968	609	417
Total Aviators	4134	77	85	92

Manpower Data⁸⁸:

Monthly Demographic and Climate Dashboard

10/18/2011 (Source: MPI)		Asian		Black		Hispanic		Other		White		Totals	
Rank	% Minority	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
O-7 / O-10	12.6%	0	0	7	0	2	1	1	0	76	0	86	1
O-6	9.3%	4	1	21	1	19	0	19	1	614	18	676	21
O-5	13.8%	29	2	95	2	78	3	56	2	1635	33	1893	42
O-4	21.6%	101	8	288	27	240	15	157	15	2957	123	3743	188
O-1 / O-3	19.5%	387	37	471	49	721	92	703	82	9797	705	12079	965
W-1 / W-5	31.3%	54	4	232	19	227	20	86	5	1361	57	1960	105
Total	20.1%	575	52	1114	98	1287	131	1021	105	16440	936	20437	1322
Percent of Total Officer		2.6%	0.2%	5.1%	0.5%	5.9%	0.6%	4.7%	0.5%	75.6%	4.3%	93.9%	6.1%

10/18/2011 (Source: MPI)		Asian		Black		Hispanic		Other		White		Totals	
Rank	% Minority	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
E-8 / E-9	42.3%	93	4	1163	92	671	43	285	12	3109	113	5321	264
E-6 / E-7	41.9%	544	69	3777	336	4350	383	1455	107	14598	691	24722	1586
E-4 / E-5	31.4%	1401	128	6158	728	8427	885	3373	345	44246	2614	63605	4700
E-1 / E-3	26.3%	1563	128	6086	820	8026	863	2879	369	54520	3590	73073	5770
Total	31.0%	3601	329	17184	1976	21474	2174	7991	833	116471	7008	166721	12320
Percent of Total Enlisted		2.0%	0.2%	9.6%	1.1%	12.0%	1.2%	4.5%	0.5%	65.1%	3.9%	93.1%	6.9%

Command Climate

4.0 - 5.0		3.5 - 3.99		3.0 - 3.49		2.5 - 2.99		2.0 - 1.99	
A		B		C		D		E	
Climate Factors				FY10	FY11				
Equal Opportunity				Final	1st Qtr	2d Qtr	3d Qtr	4th Qtr	
1	CMD Behavior Toward Minorities			4.47	4.50	4.51	4.50	4.49	
2	Religious Discrimination			4.35	4.42	4.41	4.42	4.39	
3	Disability Discrimination			4.32	4.40	4.38	4.38	4.34	
4	Age Discrimination			4.32	4.32	4.39	4.36	4.36	
5	Positive EO Behaviors			4.03	4.04	4.10	4.07	4.06	
6	Sex Harrassment & Discrimination			4.05	4.14	4.06	4.11	4.06	
7	Racist Behaviors			3.54	3.76	3.57	3.68	3.60	
Organizational Effectiveness									
1	Work Group Effectiveness			4.04	4.13	4.07	4.12	4.05	
2	Work Group Cohesion			3.87	3.93	3.90	3.91	3.86	
3	Job Satisfaction			3.79	3.88	3.83	3.87	3.81	
4	Leadership Cohesion			3.55	3.59	3.56	3.60	3.58	
5	Trust in Organization			3.43	3.53	3.49	3.47	3.46	
6	Organizational Commitment			3.35	3.52	3.43	3.45	3.41	

Total USMC Minority Percentage

	Male	Female
Marine Corps	29.9%	6.8%
Officer	24.4%	6.1%
Enlisted	34.9%	6.9%

Tone of the Force Summary

*As of 1 Jul 11		FY11					
Data Indicator	Rate of Sub	1st Qtr	2d Qtr	*3d Qtr	4th Qtr	Total	
Total Reported SH		3	5	16	7	31	
SH Substantiated	48%	1	2	7	5	15	
Total Reported Disc.		3	2	6	5	16	
Disc. Substantiated	50%	1	1	5	1	8	

Prepared by MPE

DEOMI Active and U.S. Coast Guard Demographics Data FY10⁸⁹


ACTIVE DUTY FORCES BY SERVICE - SEPTEMBER 2010																		
TOTAL			WHITE		BLACK		AMU/ALN		ASIAN		PI		MULTI		UNKNOWN		HISPANIC ETHNICITY	
ARMY																		
Officers	94,442	6.5%	68,425	72.5%	12,982	13.7%	455	0.5%	3,972	4.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	8,628	9.1%	5,933	6.3%
Enlisted	467,537	32.1%	322,191	68.9%	100,660	21.5%	4,228	0.9%	17,254	3.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	23,204	5.0%	56,707	12.1%
Total	561,979	38.5%	390,616	69.5%	113,622	20.2%	4,683	0.8%	21,226	3.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	31,832	5.7%	62,640	11.1%
NAVY																		
Officers	52,879	3.6%	42,626	80.9%	4,353	8.3%	370	0.7%	2,168	4.1%	190	0.4%	1,020	1.9%	1,952	3.7%	3,426	6.5%
Enlisted	270,460	18.5%	158,178	58.5%	53,830	19.9%	14,432	5.3%	15,783	5.8%	3,326	1.2%	18,667	6.9%	6,244	2.3%	45,375	16.8%
Total	323,139	22.2%	200,804	62.1%	58,183	18.0%	14,802	4.6%	17,951	5.6%	3,516	1.1%	19,687	6.1%	8,196	2.5%	48,801	15.1%
AIR FORCE																		
Officers	66,201	4.5%	53,102	80.2%	3,831	5.8%	304	0.5%	2,191	3.3%	219	0.3%	847	1.3%	5,707	8.6%	2,336	3.5%
Enlisted	263,439	18.1%	188,462	71.5%	44,012	16.7%	1,861	0.7%	6,537	2.5%	3,241	1.2%	6,764	2.6%	12,532	4.8%	13,485	5.1%
Total	329,640	22.6%	241,564	73.3%	47,843	14.5%	2,165	0.7%	8,728	2.6%	3,460	1.0%	7,611	2.3%	18,239	5.5%	15,821	4.8%
MARINE CORPS																		
Officers	21,391	1.5%	17,273	80.7%	1,223	5.7%	168	0.8%	523	2.4%	77	0.4%	268	1.3%	1,859	8.7%	1,525	7.1%
Enlisted	181,221	12.4%	141,983	78.3%	19,704	10.9%	2,048	1.1%	4,005	2.2%	1,740	1.0%	1,664	0.9%	10,047	5.5%	24,888	13.7%
Total	202,612	13.9%	159,256	78.6%	20,927	10.3%	2,216	1.1%	4,528	2.2%	1,817	0.9%	1,932	1.0%	11,906	5.9%	26,413	13.0%
COAST GUARD																		
Officers	8,437	0.6%	6,775	80.3%	413	4.9%	133	1.6%	70	0.8%	8	0.1%	388	4.6%	650	7.7%	547	6.5%
Enlisted	32,890	2.3%	25,011	76.0%	1,906	5.8%	880	2.7%	292	0.9%	232	0.7%	1,833	5.6%	2,736	8.3%	4,026	12.2%
Total	41,327	2.8%	31,786	76.9%	2,319	5.6%	1,013	2.5%	362	0.9%	240	0.6%	2,221	5.4%	3,386	8.2%	4,573	11.1%
Total All Services																		
Officers	243,150	16.7%	188,201	77.4%	22,782	9.4%	1,430	0.6%	8,924	3.7%	494	0.2%	2,523	1.0%	19,796	7.7%	13,767	5.7%
Enlisted	1,215,547	83.3%	835,825	68.8%	220,112	18.1%	23,449	1.9%	43,871	3.6%	8,539	0.7%	28,988	2.4%	54,763	4.5%	144,481	11.9%
Total	1,458,697	100.0%	1,024,026	70.2%	242,894	16.7%	24,879	1.7%	52,795	3.6%	9,033	0.6%	31,511	2.2%	73,559	5.0%	158,248	10.8%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center Report 3033EO

LEGEND: AM=American Indian, ALN=Alaskan Native, PI=Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, Multi-racial race

NOTES: 1. Percentages are rounded to nearest tenth. 2. *0-00, **0-00, **E-00; represent paygrade(s) are unknown

Active Duty Forces by Service as of September 2010



■ USA ■ USN ■ USAF ■ USMC ■ USCG

ACTIVE DUTY FORCES BY PAY GRADE - INCLUDING COAST GUARD - SEPTEMBER 2010																	
TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		AMIA/ALN		ASIAN		PI		MULTI		UNKNOWN		HISPANIC ETHNICITY	
OFFICER																	
O-10	39	37	94.9%	2	5.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
O-9	152	140	92.1%	11	7.2%	0	0.0%	1	0.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.7%
O-8	314	288	91.7%	21	6.7%	1	0.3%	3	1.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	0.3%	5	1.6%
O-7	479	434	90.6%	27	5.6%	1	0.2%	8	1.3%	0	0.0%	2	0.4%	9	1.9%	13	2.7%
O-6	12,269	10,830	88.1%	809	6.6%	23	0.2%	225	1.8%	12	0.1%	49	0.4%	351	2.9%	381	3.1%
O-5	28,967	24,344	84.0%	2,247	7.8%	112	0.4%	735	2.5%	36	0.1%	158	0.5%	1,335	4.6%	1,215	4.2%
O-4	45,283	35,492	78.4%	4,408	9.7%	265	0.6%	1,684	3.7%	81	0.2%	317	0.7%	3,036	8.7%	2,666	6.0%
O-3	75,311	56,706	75.3%	6,930	9.2%	364	0.5%	3,215	4.3%	170	0.2%	787	1.0%	7,139	9.5%	4,458	5.9%
O-2	25,424	19,737	77.6%	2,207	8.7%	167	0.7%	1,142	4.5%	80	0.3%	374	1.5%	1,717	6.8%	1,469	5.9%
O-1	27,262	21,006	77.1%	2,206	8.1%	229	0.8%	1,427	5.2%	84	0.3%	415	1.5%	1,965	7.0%	1,643	6.0%
*O-00	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	215,530	169,014	78.4%	18,868	8.8%	1,162	0.5%	8,438	3.9%	463	0.2%	2,102	1.0%	15,483	7.2%	11,910	5.5%
WARRANT																	
W-5	751	578	77.0%	102	13.6%	5	0.7%	10	1.3%	1	0.1%	2	0.3%	53	7.1%	36	4.8%
W-4	3,253	2,165	66.6%	651	20.0%	25	0.8%	63	1.9%	6	0.2%	4	0.1%	339	10.4%	232	7.1%
W-3	4,806	3,348	69.7%	778	16.2%	46	1.0%	116	2.4%	5	0.1%	7	0.1%	506	10.5%	396	8.2%
W-2	7,469	4,463	59.8%	1,355	18.1%	49	0.7%	159	2.1%	10	0.1%	18	0.2%	1,416	18.9%	772	10.3%
W-1	2,880	1,838	63.8%	615	21.4%	10	0.3%	68	2.4%	1	0.0%	2	0.1%	346	12.0%	301	10.5%
*W-00	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	19,183	12,412	64.7%	3,501	18.3%	135	0.7%	416	2.2%	23	0.1%	33	0.2%	2,863	13.9%	1,737	9.1%
OFFICER TOTAL																	
TOTAL	234,713	181,426	77.3%	22,369	9.5%	1,297	0.6%	8,854	3.8%	486	0.2%	2,135	0.9%	18,146	7.7%	13,647	5.8%
ENLISTED																	
E-9	10,253	8,863	86.5%	2,488	24.2%	84	0.8%	218	2.1%	46	0.4%	48	0.5%	728	7.1%	670	6.5%
E-8	27,454	16,964	61.5%	6,900	25.1%	234	0.9%	877	3.2%	79	0.3%	159	0.6%	2,311	8.4%	2,413	8.8%
E-7	97,100	60,124	61.9%	22,745	23.4%	928	1.0%	3,273	3.4%	258	0.3%	703	0.7%	9,099	9.3%	10,096	10.4%
E-6	170,553	107,862	63.2%	36,605	21.5%	2,231	1.3%	6,653	3.9%	758	0.4%	1,565	0.9%	14,879	8.7%	21,716	12.7%
E-5	249,669	166,862	66.8%	46,726	18.7%	5,139	2.1%	10,087	4.0%	1,888	0.8%	4,173	1.7%	14,816	5.9%	33,083	13.3%
E-4	276,185	201,435	72.2%	45,994	16.5%	5,948	2.1%	11,112	4.0%	2,084	0.7%	5,621	2.0%	6,991	2.5%	35,497	12.7%
E-3	228,003	164,571	72.2%	36,662	16.1%	5,269	2.3%	7,770	3.4%	2,299	1.0%	8,798	3.9%	2,634	1.2%	27,384	12.0%
E-2	75,449	54,497	72.2%	12,337	16.4%	1,744	2.3%	2,388	3.2%	544	0.7%	3,544	4.7%	395	0.5%	9,330	12.4%
E-1	44,984	31,803	70.9%	7,749	17.2%	1,012	2.2%	1,221	2.7%	352	0.8%	2,544	5.7%	203	0.5%	4,291	9.5%
*E-00	7	3	42.9%	2	28.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	0	0.0%	1	14.3%	1	14.3%
ENLISTED TOTAL																	
TOTAL	1,182,657	810,814	68.6%	218,206	18.5%	22,569	1.9%	43,579	3.7%	8,307	0.7%	27,155	2.3%	52,027	4.4%	144,481	12.2%
GRAND TOTAL																	
TOTAL	1,417,370	992,240	70.0%	240,575	17.0%	23,866	1.7%	52,433	3.7%	8,793	0.6%	29,290	2.1%	70,173	5.0%	158,128	11.2%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center Report 2012ED

LEGEND: AMI=American Indian; ALN=Arctic Native; PI=Native Hawaiian; Pacific Islander; Multiethnic race


NOTES: 1. Percentages are rounded to nearest sixth. 2. *O-00, *W-00, *E-00, represent paygrade(s) are unknown.

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center Report 301310

LEGEND: AMI=American Indian; ALN=Alaskan Native; PI=Native Hawaiian; MULTI=multi race

NOTES: 1. Percentages are rounded to nearest tenth. 2. *O-00, *W-00, *E-00, represent paygrade(s) are unknown.

Active Duty Forces by Officer/Enlisted/Race/Ethnicity as of September 2010




U.S. MARINE CORPS - SEPTEMBER 2010																	
TOTAL		WHITE		BLACK		AM/ALN		ASIAN		PI		MULTI		UNKNOWN		HISPANIC ETHNICITY	
OFFICER																	
O-10	4	4	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
O-9	18	16	88.9%	2	11.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
O-8	31	27	87.1%	3	9.7%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	3.2%	1	3.2%
O-7	38	35	92.1%	1	2.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	2	5.3%	2	5.3%
O-6	895	625	89.9%	23	3.3%	4	0.6%	6	0.9%	2	0.3%	6	0.9%	29	4.2%	16	2.3%
O-5	1,899	1,670	87.9%	89	4.7%	13	0.7%	19	1.0%	5	0.3%	19	1.0%	84	4.4%	78	4.0%
O-4	3,821	3,077	80.5%	312	8.2%	33	0.9%	90	2.4%	14	0.4%	58	1.5%	237	6.2%	272	7.1%
O-3	6,182	5,050	81.7%	295	4.8%	38	0.6%	183	3.0%	19	0.3%	66	1.1%	531	8.6%	474	7.7%
O-2	3,622	2,957	81.6%	129	3.6%	28	0.8%	103	2.8%	16	0.4%	56	1.5%	333	9.2%	237	6.5%
O-1	3,067	2,319	75.6%	110	3.6%	28	0.9%	90	2.9%	11	0.4%	45	1.5%	464	15.1%	164	8.3%
*O-00	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	19,377	15,780	81.4%	964	5.0%	144	0.7%	491	2.5%	87	0.3%	250	1.3%	1,681	8.7%	1,272	6.6%
WARRANT																	
W-5	101	74	73.3%	17	16.8%	1	1.0%	1	1.0%	0	0.0%	2	2.0%	6	5.9%	10	9.9%
W-4	288	219	76.0%	45	15.6%	4	1.4%	2	0.7%	0	0.0%	3	1.0%	15	5.2%	22	7.6%
W-3	544	405	74.4%	75	13.8%	6	1.1%	9	1.7%	3	0.6%	4	0.7%	42	7.7%	64	11.8%
W-2	844	625	74.1%	96	11.4%	12	1.4%	16	1.9%	6	0.7%	7	0.8%	82	9.7%	117	13.9%
W-1	237	170	71.7%	26	11.0%	1	0.4%	4	1.7%	1	0.4%	2	0.8%	33	13.9%	40	16.9%
*W-00	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
TOTAL	2,014	1,493	74.1%	259	12.9%	24	1.2%	32	1.6%	10	0.5%	18	0.9%	178	8.8%	253	12.6%
OFFICER TOTAL	21,391	17,273	80.7%	1,223	5.7%	168	0.8%	523	2.4%	77	0.4%	268	1.3%	1,859	8.7%	1,525	7.1%
ENLISTED																	
E-9	1,620	989	61.0%	452	27.9%	15	0.9%	19	1.2%	19	1.2%	13	0.8%	113	7.0%	161	9.9%
E-8	4,042	2,588	64.0%	900	22.3%	53	1.3%	70	1.7%	26	0.6%	37	0.9%	368	9.1%	535	13.2%
E-7	9,053	5,655	62.5%	1,575	17.4%	118	1.3%	202	2.2%	60	0.7%	92	1.0%	1,051	11.6%	1,650	18.2%
E-6	16,393	10,971	66.9%	2,567	15.8%	220	1.3%	358	2.2%	162	1.0%	169	1.2%	1,886	11.5%	3,116	19.0%
E-5	29,414	21,821	74.2%	3,275	11.1%	347	1.2%	622	2.1%	266	0.9%	367	1.2%	2,716	9.2%	5,021	17.1%
E-4	38,621	29,370	80.2%	3,321	9.1%	372	1.0%	829	2.3%	379	1.0%	346	0.9%	2,004	5.2%	4,959	12.5%
E-3	53,568	44,581	83.2%	4,621	8.6%	612	1.1%	1,193	2.2%	538	1.0%	428	0.8%	1,595	3.0%	6,125	11.4%
E-2	18,923	15,899	84.0%	1,802	9.5%	204	1.1%	480	2.4%	181	1.0%	136	0.7%	241	1.3%	2,009	10.6%
E-1	11,587	9,809	84.7%	1,161	10.0%	107	0.9%	252	2.2%	109	0.9%	76	0.7%	73	0.6%	1,312	11.3%
*E-00	0	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
ENLISTED TOTAL	181,221	141,983	78.3%	19,704	10.9%	2,048	1.1%	4,005	2.2%	1,740	1.0%	1,694	0.9%	10,047	5.5%	24,888	13.7%
GRAND TOTAL																	
TOTAL	202,612	159,256	78.6%	20,927	10.3%	2,216	1.1%	4,528	2.2%	1,817	0.9%	1,962	1.0%	11,906	5.9%	26,413	13.0%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center Report 3035EO

LEGEND: AMI=American Indian; ALN=Alaskan Native; PI=Native Hawaiian, Pacific Islander; Multi=multi race


NOTES: 1. Percentages are rounded to nearest tenth. 2. *O-00; *W-00; *E-00; represents paygrade(s) are unknown.

**U.S. Marine Corps
as of September 2010**




FY2011 USMC Almanac:

**U.S. Marine Corps
as of September 2010**



U.S. Marine Corps as of September 2010



USMC Almanac FY2011:

ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER RACIAL AND GENDER DISTRIBUTION

Rank	Black Female	Black Male	Hispanic Female	Hispanic Male	White Female	White Male	Other Female	Other Male	Total
WO/CWO	21	239	22	199	64	1,345	2	114	2,006
2ndLt	9	102	14	141	167	2,174	57	399	3,063
1stLt	16	120	21	163	227	2,809	25	238	3,619
Capt	27	283	38	345	302	4,790	35	347	6,167
Maj	23	300	12	212	112	2,917	13	211	3,800
LtCol	2	90	2	53	27	1,632	5	64	1,875
Col	2	20	0	8	18	620	1	17	686
Gen	0	5	1	2	1	81	0	1	91
Total	100	1,159	110	1,123	918	16,368	138	1,391	21,307

Slides From USMC Equal Opportunity and Diversity Management Brief to the Military Leadership Diversity Committee⁹⁰:



United States Marine Corps Equal Opportunity & Diversity Mgt Brief to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)


18 Sep 2009

Colonel Otto J. Rutt, USMC

Equal Opportunity & Diversity Management Branch
Manpower Plans & Policy
Manpower & Reserve Affairs, HQMC



Qualitative: Total Enlisted Marine Satisfaction Increasing



Plus, other survey data shows: (1) minority satisfaction equals or exceeds the majority, (2) officer satisfaction is greater than enlisted satisfaction

8



Qualitative: EO & Tone of the Force


Data Indicator (end of Aug '09)	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09 (11 months)
Total Reported Sexual Harassment Incidents	32	30	42	33	16
Substantiated Sexual Harassment Incidents	18	21	22	25	10
Total Reported Discrimination Incidents	15	25	19	19	9
Substantiated Discrimination Incidents	8	7	11	11	6

An improving Marine Corps climate: Incidents trending at lower rate in '09

9



Quantitative: Minority Representation



Active Duty Demographics Total Marine Corps Population

173,296 of Total Active Force	2000	204,307 of Total Active Force	2009
162,837 (94% of Total Marines are Male)		191,374 (94% of Total Marines are Male)	
10,459 (6% of Total Marines are Female)		12,933 (6% of Total Marines are Female)	

Demographics of Total Active Duty Marines:		
	2000	2009
Caucasian	117,041 (68%)	143,748 (70%)
African American	26,517 (15%)	21,088 (10%)
Hispanic	21,714 (13%)	24,148 (12%)
Other*	8,024 (5%)	15,323 (8%)

ALL RANKS, trend 2000-2009:

Total CAUCASIAN representation increases to 70% from 68%

Total AFRICAN AMERICAN representation decreases to 10% from 15%

Total HISPANIC representation decreases to 12% from 13%

*American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian; Declined to Respond; Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; and Other/Unknown



Active Duty Warrant Officer Demographics W-1 thru W-5

1,913 (1% of Total Active Force)	2000	2,013 (1% of Total Active Force)	2009
1,794 (94% of Warrant Officers are Male)		1,905 (95% of Warrant Officers are Male)	
119 (6% of Warrant Officers are Female)		108 (5% of Warrant Officers are Female)	

Demographics of Active Duty Warrant Officers:		
	<u>2000</u>	<u>2009</u>
Caucasian	1,429 (75%)	1,405 (70%)
African American	301 (16%)	274 (14%)
Hispanic	131 (7%)	214 (11%)
Other*	52 (3%)	120 (6%)

W-1s to W-5s, trend 2000-2009:

Total CAUCASIAN representation decreases to 70% from 75%

Total AFRICAN AMERICAN representation decreases to 14% from 16%

Total HISPANIC representation increases to 11% from 7%

*American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian; Declined to Respond; Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; and Other/Unknown

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Active Duty Demographics O-1 thru O-10 Population

16,021 (9% of Total Active Force)	2000	18,890 (9% of Total Active Force)	2009
15,208 (95% of Commissioned Officers are Male)		17,784 (94% of Commissioned Officers are Male)	
813 (5% of Commissioned Officers are Female)		1,106 (6% of Commissioned Officers are Female)	

Demographics of Active Duty Commissioned Officers:		
	<u>2000</u>	<u>2009</u>
Caucasian	13,625 (85%)	15,496 (82%)
African American	1,038 (6%)	930 (5%)
Hispanic	782 (5%)	1,100 (6%)
Other*	576 (4%)	1,364 (7%)

O-1s to O-10s, trend 2000-2009:

Total CAUCASIAN representation decreases to 82% from 85%

Total AFRICAN AMERICAN representation decreases to 5% from 6%

Total HISPANIC representation increases to 6% from 5%

*American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian; Declined to Respond; Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; and Other/Unknown

14



Recent promotions to O-7

	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10
White	11	10	10	9	8
Black	1	1	0	0	1
Hispanic	0	1*	1	1	1
Asian	0	0	0	0	0
Nat Amer	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Female	0	1	0	0	0

FY06 thru FY10 represent number of selectees to O-7 in each ethnic group.

*Hispanic Marine represents female select.

15



Active Duty Demographics O-7 thru O-10 Population

81 (0.1% of Total Active Force)	2000	93 (0.5% of Total Active Force)	2009
80 (99% of General Officers are Male)		90 (97% of General Officers are Male)	
1 (1% of General Officers are Female)		3 (3% of General Officers are Female)	

Demographics of Active Duty General Officers:		
	2000	2009
Caucasian	76 (94%)	83 (89%)
African American	3 (4%)	7 (8%)
Hispanic	2 (2%)	2 (2%)
Other*	0 (0%)	1 (1%)

O-7s to O-10s, trend 2000-2009:

Total CAUCASIAN representation decreases to 89% from 94%

Total AFRICAN AMERICAN representation increases to 8% from 4%

Total HISPANIC representation NO CHANGE to 2% from 2%

*American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian; Declined to Respond; Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; and Other/Unknown

16



Active Duty, Regular By Rank Demographics Warrant Officer W-1 thru W-5 (2009)

2,013 (1% of Total Active Force)
1,905 (95% of W-1 to W-5 Marines are male)
108 (5% of W-1 to W-5 Marines are female)

Demographics of AD Warrant Officers:

Caucasian = 1,405 (70%)
African American = 274 (14%)
Hispanic = 214 (11%)
Other* = 120 (6%)

Of W-1s to W-5s, trend 2000 - 2009:

CAUCASIAN representation
decreases to 70% from 75%

AFRICAN AMERICAN
representation decreases to
14% from 16%

HISPANIC representation increases
to 11% from 7%

		WO		CW02		CW03		CW04		CW05		Total	
White	Male	179	70%	523	64%	378	68%	189	68%	75	73%	1,344	67%
	Female	10	4%	19	2%	22	4%	7	3%	3	3%	61	3%
Black	Male	22	9%	110	13%	61	11%	43	15%	16	16%	252	13%
	Female	1	0%	8	1%	9	2%	3	1%	1	1%	22	1%
Hispanic	Male	32	13%	89	11%	47	8%	21	8%	4	4%	193	10%
	Female	2	1%	9	1%	7	1%	2	1%	1	1%	21	1%
Other	Male	9	4%	59	7%	31	6%	14	5%	3	3%	116	6%
	Female	0	0%	3	0%	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	0%
TOTAL		255		820		556		279		103		2,013	

23



Active Duty, Regular By Rank Demographics O-1 thru O-3 Population (2009)

12,414 (66% of Active Duty Officers are O-1 to O-3)

11,519 (93% of O-1 to O-3 Officers are male)

895 (7% of O-1 to O-3 Officers are female)

Of O-1s to O-3s, trend 2000-2009:

CAUCASIAN representation decreases to 81% from 82%

AFRICAN AMERICAN representation decreases to 5% from 8%

HISPANIC representation increases to 7% from 6%

		2ndLt		1stLt		Capt		Total	
White	Male	2,450	76%	2,519	77%	4,481	76%	9,450	76%
	Female	191	6%	193	6%	284	5%	668	5%
Black	Male	104	3%	126	4%	269	5%	499	4%
	Female	13	0%	15	0%	36	1%	64	1%
Hispanic	Male	157	5%	187	6%	351	6%	695	6%
	Female	20	1%	22	1%	46	1%	88	1%
Other	Male	281	9%	217	7%	377	6%	875	7%
	Female	28	1%	13	0%	34	1%	75	1%
TOTAL		3,244		3,292		5,878		12,414	

24



Active Duty, Regular By Rank Demographics O-4 thru O-6 Population (2009)

6,384 (34% of Active Duty Officers
are O-4 to O-6)

6,176 (97% of O-4 to O-6 Officers are
male)

208 (3% of O-4 to O-6 Officers are
female)

Of O-4s to O-6s, trend 2000-2009:

CAUCASIAN representation decreases
to 83% from 90%

AFRICAN AMERICAN representation NO
CHANGE to 5% from 5%

HISPANIC representation increases to
5% from 3%

		Maj		LtCol		Col		Total	
White	Male	2,902	77%	1,620	85%	620	89%	5,142	81%
	Female	106	3%	31	2%	16	2%	153	2%
Black	Male	284	7%	36	2%	19	3%	339	5%
	Female	15	0%	3	0%	3	0%	21	0%
Hispanic	Male	222	6%	65	3%	16	2%	303	5%
	Female	11	0%	1	0%	0	0%	12	0%
Other	Male	232	6%	140	7%	20	3%	392	6%
	Female	16	0%	5	0%	1	0%	22	0%
TOTAL		3,788		1,901		695		6,384	

25



Active Duty By Rank Demographics O-7 thru O-10 Population (2009)

93 (0.5% of Active Duty Officers are O-7 to O-10)

90 (97% of O-7 to O-10 General Officers are male)

3 (3% of O-7 to O-10 General Officers are female)

		BGen		MajGen		LtGen		Gen		Total	
White	Male	41	89%	22	85%	14	82%	4	100%	81	87%
	Female	0	0%	1	4%	1	6%	0	0%	2	2%
Black	Male	2	4%	3	12%	2	12%	0	0%	7	8%
	Female	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Hispanic	Male	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
	Female	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
Other	Male	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
	Female	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
TOTAL		46		26		17		4		93	

RESERVE = 1 MajGen & 3 BGen

26



Black Marine Officers by Occ Field

Occfld / Occupation description / Black Marine representation / *Unrestricted*
Marine Officer representation / Ratio

Very overrepresented

- 33 Food Service 0.51% 0.10% 5.22
- 31 Traffic Management 0.41% 0.08% 5.14
- 65 Aviation Ordnance 0.82% 0.24% 3.43
- 30 Supply Admin & Operations 11.31% 3.98% 2.84
- 01 Personnel Admin & Retention 6.42% 2.48% 2.59
- 34 Financial Management 4.08% 1.67% 2.44
- 21 Ground Ordnance Maintenance 0.51% 0.25% 2.04
- 59 Electronics Maintenance 0.41% 0.20% 2.03
- 28 Ground Electronics Maintenance 0.61% 0.30% 2.01
- 43 Public Affairs 1.53% 0.82% 1.86
- 66 Aviation Logistics 2.55% 1.38% 1.85
- 04 Logistics 14.17% 8.18% 1.73
- 58 MP & Corrections 2.04% 1.19% 1.71
- 06 Communications 9.17% 5.95% 1.54

(continued)



Black Marine Officers by Occ Field (cont.)

Occfld / Occupation description / Black Marine representation / *Unrestricted*
Marine Officer representation / Ratio

Underrepresented

- 44 Legal Services 2.45% 2.84% 0.86
- 02 Intelligence 4.89% 5.84% 0.84
- 03 Infantry 9.07% 13.06% 0.69
- 08 Field Artillery 3.47% 5.03% 0.63
- 13 Engineering, Construction, Facilities & Equipment 1.63% 2.92% 0.56

Very underrepresented

- 18 Tank & AAV 0.92% 1.98% 0.46
- 75 Pilots/NFO's 12.74% 32.59% 0.39

APPENDIX C

All,

I believe most of you now that since late last year I have been a commissioner on the Presidential "Military Leadership and Diversity Commission.

The Commission continues their work and it appears that their final report will not be complete until the end of this year.

A complete status of Information and Decision Papers (Draft) are available on the Commission's web site

<http://mldc.whs.mil/>

Although the Commission's work is open to the public I have some observations on the general issue of Diversity that I would like to share with you.

I would also like to recommend some actions that the Corps could take now to become more proactive in this same area.

Transition from an EEO to a Diversity outlook.

As we all recall, the US Military came out of the Vietnam War with significant racial issues. We overcame this by both discharging poor performers and adopting an EEO/fairness model for all service members. We enforced the law for equal opportunity and fairness, focused on the mission and emphasized the unit/team over the individual. "All Marines are Green" was the rallying cry. We "talked the talk" and "walked the walk" of fairness and racial equality based on a common standard of excellence. It worked. Times have changed. Women are a larger more involved part of the force. We have come to recognize that we need Marines of color/ethnicity for operational advantage. Being "different"—in color, gender, cultural experience and language capability-- and recognizing/leveraging those differences is what, I think, makes diversity/human capital management different from EO. Yes, the team and the mission remain paramount, but it is what we all bring to the team as individuals, is what makes the team strong. The sum of the parts is greater than the whole. Consequently, as we transition from an EO/legal view of the force to one of celebrating/acknowledging/leveraging for operational advantage our differences; we will need to adjust how leaders view diversity within the force. EO is still the baseline for fair and equal treatment but diversity will be the focus of how we manage the talent of the force.

The Business Case for Diversity.

The demographics of the Nation are changing. The American Society is becoming more diverse. In ~2025 white men will be a minority. In ~2050 white people will be a minority. If we plan to retain/sustain an "All Volunteer" Force we will need service members of ethnicity and gender in positions of senior leadership who will inspire/motivate others to aspire to follow them. Operationally we know that in current and future operations of "War Among the People" that having a diverse force and a force employing women in operational roles give our force an advantage. For example, there is not an infantry unit in OEF who does not need/use women Marines to support their ops.

The Face of the Nation.

Tied to the business case is the idea of the "Force" representing the Nation? If the country is X% a certain group--white, black, Hispanic, Asian etc.--then the representation of this demographic, at all ranks, should be reflected in the Force. Today this is not the case with regard to Officers for any of the services. That said, one presentation we received change the comparative metric from % of each group in the general population to % of each group on the population qualified to be an officer. When this metric is applied and the "representation" issue clearly evens out.

Population Qualified for Service.

Although not a direct part of the Commission's work the fact that such a low, and ever decreasing, number of Americans are qualified for military service (~30%<) with a comparatively smaller number qualified to be officers, make solving the representational problems for all services difficult. This is a National Issue that is tied to increasing the number of young people focused on STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math), general education of our youth, their physical fitness and their character/legal status. How the USMC engages in a whole of government program to change this situation will require a plan. Clearly Young Marines, Devil Pups, Marine JROTC and all the out reach the Corps does with the local communities has a bearing on this. As a data point, the US Army has 1686 JROTC units with 300 more schools on the waiting list. We have 237. I accept that JROTC is not designed to be a feeding ground for recruiting, though the Army says %30% of JROTC students become involved in the military in some way, but since we say that we Make Marines, Win Battles and

Return Better Citizens to the Nation, I would think increasing the number of MCJROTC units would have multiple benefits.

Promotions

Probably the most negative stats for the USMC are the promotion percentage for African American Officers versus their white counterparts. For both Captain to Major and Major to Lieutenant Colonel, the rate of our black officers is 5-10% below their white counterparts. Other minorities and women also have lower comparative rates but to a lesser degree. Some of this can be explained by the "law of small numbers" but that begs the question, "Why does the Corps have such a small number of minority officers?" Surprisingly, data in the Commission's paper on promotions also shows that minority/women enlisted in the Corps are also selected at a lower rate than their white counterparts.

Command and Senior Leadership Positions

The same stats generally apply to command for officers and General Officer/Flag positions. Again, the law of small numbers applies to some degree but which are aggravated by lower promotion rates. Also at play however, is the branch/MOS/OccField chosen by minorities. For women this "choice" is a matter of law, specifically the combat exclusion. Now that service in submarines has been opened for women officers, the ground combat exclusion is the only remaining occupational field denied for women. For minority men, the critical factor is the choices they make. One study shows that just under 50% of African Americans in Army ROTC chose a combat service support. In the USAF, ~2% of rated aviators are black. When 80% of all current general/flag officers come from combat arms/combat aviation/surface/sub warfare fields, this reality, whether based on culture or long term goals, statistically reduces the chances minorities who choose combat service support will even be looked at general/flag rank. There possibly ways to correct this through directed mentoring and early education about the implications of MOS choice and the positive aspects of combat arms but this would need to be implemented and assessed. Finally, outreach to minority communities/families to sell/explain that going into combat arms, at least for officers, does provide a positive advantage for post service employment.

Retention

Of the areas looked at by the Commission only retention showed minimal differentials between ethnic groups. For the Corps retention on the enlisted side for minorities is in fact higher than whites. The only outlier for all the services relates to women. Women of all services do not stay on active duty at the same rate as men. Although one might subjectively explain this through the simple fact that women have different choices to make, especially with regard to having a family, than men, there is no significant statistical basis for this difference.

Out Reach/Recruiting

The Commission's paper on outreach has some worth while recommendations on Out Reach worthy of consideration. I know that MCRC is doing a number of progressive things to engage minority populations especially on college campuses. I believe MCRC is correct in recognizing that are traditional recruiting ground, the Historical Black Colleges (HBCs) may be limiting our view of potential applicants and that we need to expand our reach to other markets. I see all the things we now do with youth previously discussed as part of this outreach program. Bottom line, we need to be more aggressive in this overall process and make out reach, advertising, key leader engagement with minority communities, and business and Congress part of an overall plan to develop/enhance the diversity of the force. If we want change/enhance any part of the diversity of the force—ethnicity/gender/language skill—we need to target those markets/population center that possess those qualified capabilities and pursue them. Part of this process for both the Navy and the Corps may be to re-visit where we have NROTC Units.

Accountability

At the end of the day when we look at our diversity stats the \$64K question is, "What can we/are we going to do to change the situation?" There has been significant discussion/commentary in the Commission's papers about making the diversity situation in a unit/organization part of the evaluation of the leader. This is something that is fairly common place in the civilian business community. The logic is that without some accountability by leadership there will be no change. CNO has a very detailed scheduled process to look at the Navy to assess the Navy's progress in the diversity area. In the end, if the leader wants to

see change you have to measure it and hold the organization accountable.

A Plan

In summary I think what we as a Corps lack is a comprehensive plan to improve and assess our progress toward improved diversity. We could start by adopting a definition of diversity; we are the only service without one. Then we might consider developing a comprehensive plan to aggressively make an effort to: educate the force on the need for diversity, education for leaders on how to lead a diverse force, an aggressive outreach/public engagement/recruiting program to attract more qualified minorities to be Marines. At the end the results of whatever we do must be assessed and accountability reviews involving senior leadership held to track our progress, modify and/or reinforce the plan. In the end, none of what we do can nor is it expected that it should change our standards. We want the best Marines we can recruit and create. We just need to make this a priority.

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